Quantum Garbled Circuits by Brakerski, Zvika & Yuen, Henry
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
01
08
5v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
1 J
un
 20
20
Quantum Garbled Circuits
Zvika Brakerski * Henry Yuen †
Abstract
We present a garbling scheme for quantum circuits, thus achieving a decomposable ran-
domized encoding scheme for quantum computation. Specifically, we show how to compute
an encoding of a given quantum circuit and quantum input, fromwhich it is possible to derive
the output of the computation and nothing else.
In the classical setting, garbled circuits (and randomized encodings in general) are a ver-
satile cryptographic tool with many applications such as secure multiparty computation, del-
egated computation, depth-reduction of cryptographic primitives, complexity lower-bounds,
and more. However, a quantum analogue for garbling general circuits was not known prior
to this work. We hope that our quantum randomized encoding scheme can similarly be useful
for applications in quantum computing and cryptography.
The properties of our scheme are analogous to ones achieved in the classical setting (in
particular to the so-called point-and-permute garbling method):
• Our scheme has perfect correctness, and has perfect information-theoretic security if we
allow the encoding size to grow exponentially with the depth of the circuit. This expo-
nential blowup can be avoided via computational assumptions (specifically, the existence
of quantum-secure pseudorandom generators).
• The encoding process is decomposable: each input qubit can be encoded independently,
when given access to a string of classical randomness and EPR pairs.
• The complexity of the encoding is comparable to that of classical garbled circuits in terms
of dependence on the size and depth of the encoded circuit (and on the security parameter
in the computational setting). Furthermore, the encoding can be computed via a constant-
depth quantum circuit with bounded-arity gates as well as quantum fan-out gates (which
come “for free” in the classical setting). Formally this is captured by the complexity class
QNC0f .
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tion (Grant No. 2016726), and by the European Union Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program via ERC Project
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1 Introduction
A randomized encoding (RE) of a function f is another function fˆ , computed probabilistically, such
that on every input x, the output f (x) can be recovered from fˆ (x), and no other information about f
or x is conveyed by fˆ (x). A trivial example of a RE of a function f is f itself. Things become much
more interesting when computing fˆ (x) is simpler in some way than computing f (x); for example,
fˆ (x) could be computed via a highly parallel process even if evaluating f (x) itself requires a long
sequential computation.
REs are central objects in cryptographic research and have proven useful in a multitude of
settings: the most famous example of a RE is Yao’s garbled circuits construction (introduced in an
oral presentation of [Yao86]), but it was only until the work of Applebaum, Ishai and Kushilevitz
in [AIK04, AIK06] that the formal notion of randomized encodings was presented. Applications
of RE range from secure multi-party computation, parallel cryptography, verifiable computation,
software protection, functional encryption, key-dependentmessage security, program obfuscation
and more. We refer the readers to an extensive survey by Applebaum [App17] for additional
details and references. Interestingly, REs have also proved useful in recent circuit lower bounds
[CR20].
An important class of randomized encodings are decomposable randomized encodings (DREs).
A good illustration of the notion of DRE is the task of “private simultaneous messages” (PSM),
introduced by Feige, Kilian and Naor [FKN94]. In a PSM protocol for computing a function f , a
set of n non-communicating players each have an input xi and send a message ei to a referee, who
then computes the output value y = f (x1, . . . , xn). Themessages ei must not reveal any information
about the xi’s aside from the fact that f (x1, . . . , xn) = y (formally, the messages ei can be simulated
given y). This can indeed be accomplished if the parties share a common random string r that is
independentof their inputs and is not known to the referee. We can thus argue that the function f is
“encoded” by the function fˆ (x1, . . . , xn; r) = (e1, . . . , en), since the output of fˆ enables exact recovery
of f (x1, . . . , xn). This encoding is “decomposable” in the sense that each ei can be computed given
access only to xi and r, i.e. we can write ei = fˆi(xi; r). It is also usually the case that some of the bits
of (one or more) ei are independent of xi and depend only on r. It is customary to refer to these bits
as the “offline” part of the encoding eoff = fˆoff(r). In the PSM application e0 can be added to either
ei or even split between a few ei’s, but it is nevertheless useful to single it out when discussing RE.
The complexity of the encoding is defined as the computational complexity of computing fˆ (and
is in particular an upper bound on the communication complexity in the PSM setting).
Using garbled circuits, in particular point-and-permute GC introduced by Beaver, Micali and
Rogaway [BMR90, Rog91], it is possible to construct DRE with perfect decoding correctness and
perfect simulation security for any function f with complexity that scales with the formula size
of f . Using pseudorandom generators it is possible to reduce this complexity to only scale with
the circuit size of f , but now security will only hold against computationally bounded adversaries.
This allows to efficiently and securely perform the PSM task, and the multitude of other tasks
mentioned above at complexity that does not scale much beyond that of f itself.
In some cases, evennon-decomposableRE can be useful. However, someother non-degeneracy
condition should be imposed, since as mentioned before f itself is trivially a non-decomposable RE
of itself. For example, if some measure of complexity for computing fˆ is lower than that measure
for f (in known constructions this usually refers to parallel complexity or circuit depth), we can
use RE for the purpose of delegating computation. A verifier who wishes to learn the output of f
computes the RE of (a slightly modified version of) f , and request that it is decoded by the prover.
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The output of the decoding procedure is then sent back to the verifier who can tell based on the
output that the decoding was performed properly, and what is the value of f that was obtained.1
Therefore, the verifier’s complexity will be proportional to that of the RE of f rather than to the
complexity of f itself. In particular, it is possible to construct fˆ where each output bit only depends
on 4 input bits (a single xi and 3 bits from r). This means that a very shallow verifier can delegate
arbitrarily complex polynomial-time computable functions.
Given the richness and utility of randomized encodings in cryptography and theoretical com-
puter science, it is very natural to ask whether there exists a quantum analogue of randomized
encodings. Despite its appeal, this question has remained open, and as far as we know the notion
was not even formally defined in the literature before.
1.1 Quantum Randomized Encodings
In this paper we introduce the notion of randomized encodings in the quantum setting, propose
a construction, and analyze it. Our definition is an adaptation of the classical one: the quantum
randomized encoding (QRE) of a quantum operation F (which is implemented by some quantum
circuit) and a quantum state x is a quantum state Fˆ(x) satisfying two properties:
1. (Correctness). The quantum state F(x) can be decoded from Fˆ(x).
2. (Privacy). The encoding Fˆ(x) reveals no information about F or x apart from the output F(x).
The privacy property is formalized by saying there is a simulator that, given F(x), can compute
the encoding Fˆ(x). Furthermore, we also define what it means for a QRE to be decomposable: the
encoding Fˆ(x) can be computed in a way that each qubit of the input x is encoded independently,
and the encoding takes in as input x, a classical random string r, and a sequence of EPR pairs e. 2
(See Section 4.1 for a formal definition of (decomposable) QRE.)
We then present a construction of a decomposable QRE (see Section 4.2 for a formal statement
of our main result):
Theorem 1.1 (Main result, informal). Suppose CRE is a classical DRE scheme with perfect correctness,
information-theoretic (resp. computational) privacy, and polynomial time decoding. Then there exists a
decomposable QRE scheme QRE with the following properties:
1. QRE has perfect correctness, and the decoding procedure of QRE runs in polynomial time.
2. QRE uses CRE as a black box, and has information-theoretic (resp. computational) privacy.
3. If the encoding procedure of CRE can be computed inNC0, then the encoding procedure of QRE can
be computed in QNC0f (i.e. the class of constant-depth quantum circuits with unbounded fan-out
gates).
1Specifically, assume f has binary output and consider f ′ that computes f and then outputs one of two long random
strings (given as additional input) according to the output bit of f . The verifier can check that it indeed received one
of the two strings, and the security of the RE guarantees that the prover can only obtain one of the two strings, and in
particular the one that matches the correct value of f .
2We recall that an EPR pair is a pair of “maximally entangled” qubits. Formally, qubits whose joint state is |00〉+|11〉√
2
.
We note that EPR pairs in fact generalize the notion of classical randomness, since the marginal distribution (“reduced
density matrix”) of the first (say) qubit in the pair is equivalent to a classical random bit (in other word, an EPR pair is
a “purification” of a classical random bit). However, we chose to distinguish between the classical and quantum parts
of the randomness/EPR string since, as we explain below, some parts of the encoding procedure only requires to access
the classical part of the string.
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We elaborate on the properties of the QRE scheme below. It assumes the existence of a classical
DRE scheme CRE with specific correctness, privacy, and complexity properties; examples of
such schemes can be found in [BMR90, Rog91] (also see the survey in [App17]). In the case of
computational privacy, we assume the existence of quantum-secure one-way functions.
Correctness. The correctness property asserts that from an encoding Fˆ(x), it is possible to decode
the output state F(x) with probability 1. This is inherited from the perfect correctness property of
CRE. Furthermore, the decoding procedure preserves quantumcorrelationswith side information:
if (x, y) denotes the joint state of the input x and some auxiliary quantum state y which may be
entangled with x, then the joint state of the output and side information after decoding is (F(x), y).
The decoding procedure also takes polynomial time in the size of encoding. This inherits the
polynomial-time decoding complexity of CRE.
Privacy. The privacy property implies that there exists a quantum algorithm Sim such that
Sim(F(x)) is indistinguishable from the encoding Fˆ(x), and furthermoreSim runs in timepolynomial
in |Fˆ(x)|, the size of the encoding. The quantumscheme inherits its privacy from the classical scheme
in a black box way: if CRE is secure against all (quantum) distinguishers of size S, then QRE is
secure against distinguishers of size at most S − Λ where Λ is the complexity of decoding Fˆ(x)
(which is polynomial in the size of Fˆ(x)). Note that information-theoretic privacy corresponds to
privacy against distinguishers of all sizes.
The privacy property also holds even when considering entangled side information: the joint
state (Sim(F(x)), y) (which is computed by applying F, then Sim to the input x) is indistinguishable
from (Fˆ(x), y).
Size of the Encoding. The size of the encoding of QRE is the number of qubits in Fˆ(x), which
depends on the circuit size and depth of F, and also on the size of the classical encodings computed
in the scheme CRE. For example, the classical DRE schemes from [BMR90, Rog91] with computa-
tional privacy have encoding size that scales polynomially with the circuit size of f . This translates
to the size of Fˆ being polynomial in the circuit size of F. On the other hand, the known classical DRE
schemes with information-theoretic privacy all have encodings fˆ that grow exponentially with the
circuit depth of the function f . Using such a DRE scheme, the size of the corresponding quantum
encoding Fˆ also grows exponentially with the circuit depth of the quantum operation F. However
we note that even in this case, the number of EPR pairs used in the encoding Fˆ(x) remains linear
in the circuit size of F.
Complexity and Locality of Encoding. The decomposability of the encoding Fˆ(x) is analogous
to the decomposability property of classical DRE schemes, where the encoding can be expressed
as the following concatenation:
Fˆ(x; r, e) = (Fˆoff(r, e), Fˆ1(x1; r, e), . . . , Fˆn(xn; r, e))
where we indicate the dependency of the encoding on randomness string r and a sequence of EPR
pairs e. The state Fˆoff(r, e) is called the “offline” part of the encoding that depends only on F (but
not x), and {Fˆ j(x j; r, e)} j forms the “online” part of the encoding where x j is the j-th qubit of the
n-qubit state x. (In the garbled circuit setting, Fˆoff corresponds to the garbled circuit, and Fˆ j(x j)
corresponds to the labels of each of the input bits).
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The encoding procedure of QRE is highly parallelizable. Suppose that the encoding procedure
of CRE is computable inNC0 (which is the case for the randomized encoding schemes of [BMR90,
Rog91]). Then the offline part Fˆoff(r; e) can be computed by aQNC
0
f circuit acting on (r, e); aQNC
0
f
circuit is a constant-depth circuit composed of gates with constant arity (the number of qubits
it acts on), as well as fan-out gates (with unbounded arity), which implement the functionality
|x〉|y1〉 · · · |yn〉 → |x〉|x ⊕ y1〉 · · · |x ⊕ yn〉. Similarly, Fˆ j(x j; r, e) can be computed by a QNC0f circuit
acting on r, a constant number of qubits of e, and the qubit x j (but does not depend on the gates of
F).
We note that in the quantum setting it is not so clear what is the “correct” analogue for the
complexity class NC0, which is the class of functions that can be computed in constant-depth, or
equivalently, functions where each output bit depends only on a constant number of input bits.
This implicitly assumes that input bits can be replicated an arbitrary number of times (for example,
all of the output bits may depend on one input bit). However, due to the No-Cloning Theorem
we cannot assume that input qubits can be copied, and thus it seems reasonable to consider
constant-depth quantum circuits augmented with fan-out gates. However, the fan-out gate does
appear to yield unexpected power in the quantum setting: for example, the parity gate can be
computed inQNC0f , while classically it is even outsideAC
0 (see e.g. [Moo99, HS05]). Nevertheless,
QNC0f circuits appear to be weaker than general polynomial-size quantum circuits and it may be
reasonable to assume that it will be possible to implement the fan-out gate in “constant depth”
in some quantum computing architectures (see [HS05] for discussion). Our encoding procedure
only requires a single layer of fan-out gates; in the computational setting the required fan-out is
roughly the security parameter, and in the information-theoretic setting the fan-out is exponential
in the depth of the circuit being encoded.
Classical Encoding for Classical Inputs. A desirable property that comes up in the quantum
setting is to allow some for the parties to remain classical, even when performing a quantum task.
In the RE setting, we would like to allow parties with a classical inputs to compute their encoding
in a classical manner (and in particular with access only to the classical part of the randomness/EPR
string). Our scheme indeed allows this type of functionality, and therefore allows applications such
as quantum PSM (as discussed above) even when some of the parties are classical. Nevertheless,
the encoding (and in particular the offline part that depends on the circuit) requires quantum
computation.
One could have hoped that if the quantum circuit and input are both given classically (i.e. as
a classical description of a quantum circuit, and a classical input to this circuit), then perhaps the
QRE encoding could be done completely classically. Such a property could be quite useful (for
example towards obfuscating quantum circuits analogously to [App14a]). However we note that
it is quite unlikely that QRE with this property will have same strong security properties as we
achieve. Specifically, as shown by Applebaum [App14b], any language decidable by a class of
circuits that has an efficient classical randomized encoding with statistical security falls into the
class SZK ⊆ PH. Therefore, if we could achieve QRE with statistical security for polynomial size
quantum circuits, this would imply BQP ⊆ SZK which is deemed highly unlikely (and either
way far from being provable), especially in light of the recent result of Raz and Tal [RT19]. Our
method implies statistical (and in fact perfect) security, but the encoding process is only efficient
for circuits of logarithmic depth. Nevertheless, it seems that the strong security properties that
we achieve pose a barrier towards achieving a completely classical encoding.3 The question of
3We thank Vinod Vaikuntanathan for pointing this out to us.
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whether classical QRE is achievable (with computational security) remains as an intriguing open
problem.
1.2 Other Related Work
Wemention some relatedworkon adapting the notion of randomized encodings/garbled circuits to
the quantum setting. In [KW17], Kashefi andWallden present an interactive, multi-round protocol
for verifiable, blind quantum computing, that is inspired by Yao’s garbled circuits. The motivation
for their protocol comes fromwanting aprotocolwhere aweakquantumclient delegates aquantum
computation to a powerful quantum server, while still maintaining verifiability.
In a recent paper [Zha20] (which builds on prior work [Zha19]), Zhang presents a blind dele-
gated quantum computation protocol that is (partially) “succinct”: it is an interactive protocolwith
an initial quantum phase whose complexity is independent of the computation being delegated,
and the second phase is completely classical (with communication and round complexity that
depends on the size of the computation). The security of the protocol is proved in the random
oracle model. The construction and analysis appear to use ideas from classical garbled circuits.
Both the work of [KW17] and [Zha20] focus on protocols for delegated quantum computation,
and both protocols involve a large number of rounds of interaction that grow with the size of
the computation being delegated. In contrast, the focus of our work is on studying the notion of
quantum randomized encodings (in which the number of rounds of interaction is constant).
The aforementioned [Zha19] constructs an object that is more related to the one studied in this
work. It is in fact a QRE (although this notion is not formally defined in their paper) for a very
restricted family of quantum circuits (C+P circuits, which notably do not contain the Hadamard
gate). The advantage of this scheme is that given a classical description of the C+P circuit and a
classical input, the encoding is classical.
Comparison with (Quantum) Fully Homomorphic Encryption. A fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (FHE) scheme is an encryption scheme which allows to apply functionality on the encrypted
information without decrypting it first. Recently there is a lot of interest in the quantum variant
which also allows to apply quantum functionality [BJ15, DSS16, Mah18, Bra18]. FHE and RE may
seem related, and there are contexts where both techniques are applicable such as secure compu-
tation and delegation of computation. Let us therefore clarify the difference between these two
objects (which applies in both the classical and quantum setting).
FHE allows to encrypt an input x (and possibly also a circuit), and send Enc(x) it to a remote
evaluator. The evaluator can then compute Enc( f (x)) from the given ciphertext, without learning
anything about the contents of x. Note that having computed Enc( f (x)) the evaluator still cannot
learn any information about the plaintext value f (x) itself. It can then send Enc( f (x)) to a party
whichholds a secret decryptionkey, and this party candecrypt and recover the value f (x). Note that
we cannot just provide the decryption key to the evaluator since this will allow them to learn the
value x itself. InRE, it is possible to startwith f, xandproduce an encoding that allows the evaluator
to learn the value f (x) without having to send the ciphertext to another party to be decrypted.
There are some interesting connections between FHE and RE, and in particular it is sometimes
possible to use RE to construct so-called “non-compact” FHE, see [GHV10]. For concrete known
constructions, while RE (and as we show here QRE) with useful properties can be constructed
under minimal assumptions such as the existence of one-way functions (and sometimes even
information theoretically), the assumptions required for (compact) FHE/QFHE are more elaborate
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and most often require concrete assumptions such as the hardness of the learning with errors
problem.
1.3 Applications and Future Directions
Many of the applications of RE in the classical setting seem to carry over to the quantum setting,
possibly with some necessary adjustments. As the variety of applications of RE is so vast, we
view it as outside the scope of this paper to go over and attempt to re-prove them. We therefore
highlight the most immediate ones here. We then move on to consider some directions for further
study.
PSM and Delegation. Two immediate applications that were mentioned above are private si-
multaneous messages (PSM) and delegation. Indeed, PSM is almost equivalent to decomposable
RE, and therefore our results show how to achieve PSM in the quantum setting, using quantum
messages and a quantum shared string (or even a classical shared string in the case where the
input is completely classical). In terms of delegation, QRE implies that any quantum computation
can be delegated (in 2 messages) using, essentially, aQNC0f verifier.
4
Two-Party Secure Computation. Applications to MPC in the context of round reduction also
seem to follow. In particular, one can use our construction to obtain an analogue of Yao’s original
2-message two-party MPC protocol using (classical) oblivious transfer (OT) as a building block.
We recall that in OT, we have a receiver with a bit b, and a sender with two strings r0, r1, and in the
end of the execution the receiver learns rb and the sender learns nothing about b.
We can consider two partiesA,B, each ofwhich holding a quantum input, x, y respectively, and
they wish to jointly compute a quantum operation F on their inputs whose output is delivered to
A.5 This can be done as follows. PartyA encrypts its inputwith a classical keyusing a quantumone-
time pad (QOTP, [AMTdW00]), it sends the encrypted input to B and conducts an OT protocol as
a receiver, for each bit of the classical pad for the QOTP. Party B considers a quantum functionality
F′ that takes as input an encrypted x, (unencrypted) y, and classical QOTP key. On this input, F′
first decrypts x and then applies the original F on x, y. Party B creates a decomposable QRE of F′,
plugging in the encrypted x that was received from A, and its own unencrypted input y. We recall
that for classical input bits, our QRE is classical and decomposable, which means that for each
classical input bit we can generate two labels r0, r1, such that if the value of the bit is b then the
part of the encoding that depends on this bit is rb. This means that party B can send the parts of
the encoding that it can compute, and complete the OT protocol as a sender with values r0, r1 for
each bit of classical input. This will allow party A to obtain the encoding of F, apply the decoding
procedure and learn the intended output.
It appears that one should be able to prove security of such a protocol in the specious model
[DNS10], which is the mildest model of security in the quantum setting, if the underlying classical
OT primitive is also specious secure.6 However, a formal proof is tangent to the scope of this work
4One should be careful since the final step of verification requires comparing two long classical strings, which can
be done inQNC0f with bounded error [HS05].
5Interestingly, contrary to the classical setting, this does not seem to immediately imply a protocol for the setting
where both parties receive an output with the same round complexity (if we consider a general quantum operation).
One additional round message seems to be needed in this case.
6At a high level, we believe that a proof goes through by requiring all parties to run all functions of the protocol in a
purified manner.
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and one should only treat this as a candidate until a formal proof is presented. We also note that
protocols with comparable round complexity can be achieved using quantum fully homomorphic
encryption [BJ15, DSS16, Mah18, Bra18].
One could consider further applications in the context of MPC such as improved quantum
MPC in the multi-party setting and in the malicious setting [DNS12, DGJ+19].
Functional Encryption. It was noticed in [SS10] that decomposable RE schemes imply a limited
form of functional encryption (FE). An encryption scheme where there are multiple secret keys,
associated with functions, so that when sk f decrypts Enc(x) the output is f (x). In the classical
setting RE implies FE without “collusion resistance” (i.e. an adversary should not be allowed
to obtain more than a single functional key). It was then showed [GVW12] how to extend this
technique to FE with “bounded collusion”. This construction seem to carry over to the quantum
setting using our QRE scheme, under the appropriate definition of FE. However, some definitional
work is required in order to formally substantiate the definition and show the connection in the
quantum setting.
A more ambitious goal is to construct succinct FE schemes (even with bounded collusion) and
so-called “reusable” garbled circuits which are function-private symmetric-key FE, analogously
to the classical constructions in [GKP+13] (but possibly using different technique). One obstacle
that seems to prevent direct application is the absence of a quantum attribute-based encryption
schemes that are a central building block in that construction.
Classical Garbling and Quantum Obfuscation. As we mentioned above, if it is possible to
construct a classical QRE for classical inputs and function descriptions, then it would allow to
construct quantum indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) from the classical variant, similarly to
[App14a, BCG+18]. Constructing iO for quantum circuits is one of the intriguing open problems in
the context of quantum cryptography, and with the connections between iO and RE in the classical
setting, one would hope that QRE could be a useful tool in establishing it.
1.4 Paper Organization
Section 2 contains a technical overview of our contribution. Section 3 contains notation and
preliminaries about quantum computation and classical randomized encoding. In Section 4 we
define the notion of quantum randomized encoding, state some of its basic properties and state our
main result. Section 5 contains our QRE construction and Section 6 contains proofs of correctness
and privacy.
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2 Overview of Our Construction
We provide an overview of our techniques, we refer to the technical sections for the formal
presentation and proofs.
2.1 Overview of Quantum Gates
For the sake of completeness, we briefly recall the notions of Pauli operations, Clifford operations
and the T gate. The Pauli group (on a single qubit) is generated by two unitary operations. One
that applies a bit flip X, and one that applies a phase flip Z. A general operation in the group can
be written (up to global phase) as XaZb where a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Multi-qubit Pauli simply consists of
applying a Pauli to each qubit individually. The Clifford group is the group of all unitaries that
normalize the Pauli group, i.e. C such that for all a, b there exist a′, b′ for which CXaZb = Xa′Zb′C.
This means that applying a Pauli to the input of a Clifford gate is equivalent to applying a (possibly
different) Pauli to its output. The Clifford family is fairly rich. It trivially contains Pauli operators
but also the Hadamard gate H (binary quantum Fourier transform), the controlled-not CNOT
operation and the so-called P gate (or π/4-phase operation): |x〉 → ix|x〉. Nevertheless, the Clifford
group is not universal and it is known that circuits which only contain Clifford gates can be
simulated classically. Considering the T gate (or π/8-phase operation) in addition to Clifford
implies a universal set of gates. While the T gate does not normalize the Pauli group, it holds that
for all a, b there exists a′, b′ s.t. TXaZb = Xa′Zb′Pa′T. That is, Pauli operations “pass through” the
T gate, but possibly require an additional phase correction by a P gate which is a Clifford gate
but not a Pauli. We note that despite the syntactic similarity to the behavior of a Clifford gate,
the additional (conditional) P gate makes a big difference. For example, it prevents meaningful
application of additional gates (even Clifford) on the output.
2.2 Our Approach: Quantum Computation via Teleportation
The basis of our approach to quantum RE is computation by teleportation, an idea that is common to
many prior results on protocols for delegated quantum computation and computing on encrypted
data [BFK09, BJ15, DSS16]. We briefly review this concept.
We recall the notion of quantum teleportation that allows one party to transmit a qubit to
another party using only classical communication, assuming that the two parties share an EPR
pair. Specifically, the sending party performs some quantumoperations followed bymeasurement,
and obtains two (uniformly distributed) classical bits a, b. The transformed state will thus appear
on the receiving party’s half of the EPR pair, but masked by the Pauli XaZb.7
Consider a quantum circuit with twogatesG1 andG2; assume for now that they are single-qubit
gates – generalizing to multiple qubits is straightforward. Consider the wire in the circuit that
connects the output of gateG1 to the input of gateG2. Now, instead of connecting the wire directly,
we replace the wire with an EPR pair, and teleport the output of G1 using this EPR pair.
8 That
is, we apply a “teleport send” operation on the output of G1 and half-EPR, and apply G2 on the
other half-EPR. The result of this operation is that on one hand we computed the “mask bits” a, b,
7As we mentioned above, a random Pauli completely masks any information, so the receiving party is completely
oblivious about the content of the teleported qubit until it receives a, b.
8One way to think about it is that teleportation is in fact a randomized encoding of the pass-through (or identity)
function. This viewpoint demonstrates the usefulness of thinking even about known quantum gadgets through the RE
perspective, and the usefulness of RE that may seem trivial or unnecessarily costly at first glance.
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and on the other we applied G2 not on the “correct” output value of G1, but rather on the masked
value. In other words, instead of applyingG2 we effectively appliedG2X
aZb, for the a, b values that
were retrieved by the “teleport send” protocol. It is important to notice that if G2 was a Clifford
operation, then G2X
aZb = Xa
′
Zb
′
G2 for some bits a
′, b′ that are deterministic functions of a, b and
G2, so this is effectively equivalent to performing G2 on the right input, but mask the output with
values a′, b′. If G2 is a T gate, then G2XaZb = Xa
′
Zb
′
Pa
′
G2, so it is not only that the values of the
mask bits change, but the mask is no longer a Pauli operation (which makes a big difference, as
we will see next).
This suggests a method for quantum randomized encoding, at least for some types of circuits.
Let us consider circuits that only contain Clifford operations (keeping in mind that this is a very
restricted class which is “close” to classical in some sense). In this case, we can apply the above
protocol to all gates of the circuit. Input wires will be treated the same way, where we think of the
inputs simply as the output of some initial gate G0 whose functionality need not be known. This
will lead to Paulimasks propagating through the circuit according to theClifford propagation rules,
and new mask bits being generated at every wire due to the teleportation operation. Eventually
we will end up with a multitude of classical (a, b) pairs, one for each wire in the original circuit,
as well as the quantum output of the last layer of gates in the circuit. The quantum output will
correspond to the correct quantum output of the Clifford circuit that we are evaluating, masked
with a Pauli XafinZbfin . The classical values afin, bfin can be computed classically from the values of
all (a, b) pairs generated in the process (and the structure of the circuit). This final quantum state,
togetherwith the afin, bfin values will constitute a QRE of the circuit, since they allow to recover the
output, but nothing more (so long as the intermediate a, b values of the individual gates are not
revealed). The complexity of computing all (a, b) pairs and the quantum output are also modest
and local, since each gate is handled independently. Alas, the computation of afin, bfin, while being
classical, has classical complexity that scales with the quantum complexity of the original circuit.
We notice that this problem can be solved using a classical RE to encode to computation of afin, bfin
from the intermediate a, b values.
Thus, we see that for Clifford circuits we can construct QRE with properties comparable to
those of classical decomposable RE. The encoding of each input simply constitutes of teleporting
it using an EPR pair from the common tape, so the QRE obtained is decomposable as desired.
Furthermore, we note that if some input bit xi is classical then there is no need to teleport it. In
such a case it suffices to teleport the constant 0 value, and then modify the a value that is obtained
in the teleportation to a ⊕ xi (which can be performed as a part of the afin, bfin computation using
the classical RE). The reason is that the Pauli operation X is a bit-flip operation, so translating
a→ a ⊕ xi is equivalent to changing the teleported value from 0 to 0 ⊕ xi = xi.
2.3 The Challenge: Going Beyond Clifford Gates
As in many other settings in quantum delegation and quantum cryptography, the case of Clifford
circuits admits a fairly simple solution, and the real challenge comes in addressing T gates. It is
apparent that the above outline does not work as-is for T gates, since the P correction gets “stuck
in the way” and does not allow to propagate the computation. Therefore, if in our example above
G2 was a T gate, we would need to find a way to remove the P operation from the output before
teleporting onward. The crux of the challenge is to be able to apply a Pa
′
operation on the output
of G2 before teleporting it. The value a
′ depends on whether G2 was a T gate (since if it is a
Clifford then no P correction is needed), but it also depends on the a, b values of all gates which
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topologically precede the current T gate (similarly to afin, bfin discussed above). This means that
the encoder does not know a′ explicitly at the time of encoding and these values are only explicitly
computed at decoding time.
At this point we notice that our task as been reduced to the following. Find QRE for “correct-
and-teleport” circuits, where a Clifford correction (which is implicit at encoding time) is applied
to the input and the input is then teleported using a half-EPR which is provided as additional
input. The reason is that given such encoding, we will encode a T gate by first applying the T gate
(as outlined above) and then computing said QRE on the output of the T gate. This will be done
using a new object that we call group-randomizing QRE and is presented in Section 2.4 below.
However, in order to be able to use our new building block, we need an important simplification
to the correct-and-teleport model.
We notice that correct-and-teleport circuits are almost Clifford circuits. The correction part is
Clifford by definition, and teleportation only requires applying Clifford gates. Alas, teleportation
also requiresmeasuring twoqubits. The output of thismeasurement determine thePauli correction
that the teleportation-receiver needs to apply, and by extension also the Clifford correction of the
next T gate. Measuring is a non-unitary operation (and therefore not a Clifford unitary). Our
essential simplification is to show that measurement can be replaced by a Clifford operation
without revealing additional information on the output. This is done using the well known
“twirling” mechanism as follows.9
Casting Teleportation as Clifford via Twirling. We explained above that applying a random
Pauli to a quantum state removes all information about the state. In similar vein, randomly
applying just the Z gate (i.e. applying Zs for a randomly chosen bit s) removes all information
except the information that is recoverable via measurement (in the computational basis). This
means that if can make the evaluator apply Zs, while keeping the value of s itself hidden, then this
is equivalent to forcing a measurement (in the computational basis). This is the case even if the
evaluation is performed in a fully coherent manner.10
We conclude that our challenge is to provide QRE for twirled correct-and-teleport circuits,
which are completely Clifford, but have a classical description that is not explicitly known to the
encoder, and only unfolds at decoding time. Next we present a building block that is instrumental
for solving this problem.
2.4 A Building Block: Group-Randomizing QRE
We now consider a blueprint for QRE, that we call group-randomizing QRE, which can in principle
be applied to any quantum circuit, but in general it requires exorbitant resources (exponential
in the number of qubits). We then show that this blueprint can be efficiently applied to encode
Clifford circuits (and subgroups thereof), and is thus applicable towards instantiating the correct-
and-teleport gadget we are interested in. This blueprint has the following properties that will
come in handy:
• The encoding process contains a quantum “input encoding” that is applied to the input of
the circuit, and a classical “circuit encoding” that is applied to the encoding of the circuit.
9This is another example (in addition to teleportation that wasmentioned before)where it is instrumental to interpret
a known quantum gadget as QRE.
10In more technical terms, the fact that s is unknown means that effectively even a pure evaluation results in a mixed
state induced by the randomness of the bit s.
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• The encoding only uses classical randomness (no need for EPR pairs).
• The quantum input encoding is completely oblivious of the description of the circuit, so the
input can be encoded even when the circuit is not (yet) known.
These properties will allow us to handle the case where the description of the circuit is not known
explicitly during encoding, but rather the circuit depends on (classical) values that are revealed
only during the decoding process. This is because we can use classical RE to “defer” the classical
part of the encoding (the one that depends on the circuit) to be computed by the decoder.
On the other hand, we point out that this encoding also has less favorable properties. For
example it is not decomposable and it is cannot directly be used to efficiently encode non-Clifford
circuits. Therefore this encoding is only suitable as a building block, but cannot replace the other
aforementioned techniques used in our QRE. However, in Section 2.7 below we show that the
group-randomizing technique can be leveraged to a QRE for all circuits in yet another way which
has some disadvantages compared to our full-fledged scheme, but is simpler in some aspects.
We now present our blueprint, starting from the (inefficient) case of general unitary circuits
before zooming-in to the efficient implementation for Clifford circuits. Consider a quantum
functionality represented by a unitary C. And consider a QRE for applying C on input x as follows.
The encoding uses a classical random string to sample a completely random unitary matrix R (note
that this is impossible to do in general and vastly inefficient to do even to within good precision,
but we nevertheless want to consider it for the moment). The QRE will contain a quantum part of
simply applying R on the input x to obtain z = R(x), and a classical part that contains the matrix
E = CR† (again, let us not concern ourselves with efficiency at this point and just assume that the
matrix is simply represented entry-wise). This is indeed a QRE of C(x) as follows. For correctness
one can decode by computing E(z) = CR†R(x) = C(x). Simulation is done by noticing that since
the unitaries constitute a group, the marginal of E is also uniform over the group of unitaries. We
furthermore note that we can write R = E†C, so a simulator that is given y = C(x), can output
z = E†(y),E which will consist of perfect simulation of the encoding. We note that this method
is conceptually similar to the well known classical RE techniques for branching programs using
matrix randomization [Kil88].
As explained above, applying thismethodwith randomunitaries is vastly inefficient. However,
we notice that in some cases (including ones thatwill be of interest to us), there is no need forR to be
a random unitary. If we know that C comes from some subgroupG of the unitaries, then it suffices
to sample R from this subgroup, rather than as a completely random unitary. Furthermore, if there
is an efficient algorithm for sampling random G elements, say represented as a polynomial-size
quantum circuit, as well as an efficient algorithm to find a canonical form for circuits in G, then
the above can be made efficient as follows. Recall that we are given an input x and C ∈ G, where
the latter is now efficiently represented as a circuit. Instead of sampling a matrix R, we sample
(efficiently) a circuit representation of R, which will allow to efficiently apply it on the input x.
We also need to output an efficient representation of E = CR† ∈ G, which we do by computing a
canonical circuit for this functionality. Correctness and simulation proceed exactly as above.
One interesting group G to consider is the Clifford group, which indeed admits efficient sam-
pling and efficient canonical form computation (see, e.g., [Got98, AG04]). However, things can
be even simpler for subgroups of Clifford. In particular notice that for tensor groups (ones that
are a tensor of groups of single-qubit operations) it will be possible to perform the encoding in
a wire-by-wire manner, and for groups with especially simple canonical form (such as the Pauli
group or simple generalizations thereof) the quantum part can be computed by a constant depth
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circuit containing only single qubit gates.
Wewould like tomake a final observation on a settingwhereC itself is not known at the time of
encoding, which will indeed be the case where we use the above in the context of our QRE scheme.
Assume that C is not given, but rather it is computed as a (classical) function f of some input a.
Then it is still possible to apply the quantum part of the encoding to obtain the value z, but the
value E cannot be computed. Nevertheless, the computation of E is a classical procedure 1 that
takes a,R as input, so that 1 first computes C = f (a) and then computes and outputs the canonical
form of E = CR†. We can therefore apply a classical decomposable RE of 1 rather than computing
1 itself. This means that the task of computing C(x) now boils down to the rudimentary classical
task of selecting one-out-of-two labels for each bit of the description a.
2.5 Putting it Together
Wecan nowgoback anddescribe our gate encodingprocedure for the gateG2. We start by applying
G2 on the relevant half-EPRqubit, and considering the (twirled) correct-and-teleport Clifford circuit
whose (classical) description is determined by the a, b values of predecessor gates. We consider the
group-randomizing QRE of this correct-and-teleport circuit according to the outline above. The
quantumpart of the group-randomizing encodingprocess does not dependat all on thedescription
of the correct-and-teleport circuit itself, so we can apply it during the encoding of the G2 gate. As
for the classical part of the QRE, as suggested above we encode it using a decomposable classical
RE as a function of the predecessor a, b. Recall that a decomposable classical RE has an offline part
and input labels. The offline part is output as a part of the encoding of the gate G2. As for the
labels, we need to post the labels that correspond to the actual a, b values of the predecessor gates.
However, these values are no longer known at decoding time, since they are produced as a part of
the teleportation process.
To address this last difficulty, we “push” the selection of the label into the classical description
of the circuit. Rather than just performing the correction, teleportation and twirling, our Clifford
circuit will have, as a part of the circuit description, the labels of the decomposable classical RE of
all successor gates, and the circuit will output the classical RE labels to be used in the future gates
instead of using the actual measured a, b values.11 This requires the input/output length of the
Clifford to grow with the size of the classical RE labels (which in the perfect information-theoretic
security setting continues to propagate backwards and creates the exponential growth of labels as
a function of the depth).
Some Optimizations. The scheme as describes above requires computing the group-
randomizing QRE on long inputs (whose size grows with the size of the classical RE labels).
This means that we need to apply a random Clifford on a polynomial number of qubits, which
does not fit into the class QNC0f . However, by careful consideration of the circuit at hand, we
notice that our Clifford C can be written as C = C2C1, where C1 is a fixed QNC
0
f circuit that does
not depend on the classical value a, and C2 comes from a tensor group of simple gates (a slight
generalization of the Pauli group). Therefore, it is possible to apply C1 at encryption time, and only
use the group-randomizing QRE for C2, which will only require simple single-qubit randomizers.
11In fact, it is possible to set things up so that the dependence is only on the immediate successor and not on all
descendants.
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2.6 Security of Our Scheme
The privacy properties of our randomized encoding scheme is established via the existence of a
simulator, which is an efficient procedure Sim that takes as input a quantum state F(x) for some
quantum circuit F and state x, and produces another quantum state that is indistinguishable from
the randomized encoding Fˆ(x). This formalizes the idea that the only thing that can be learned
from the randomized encoding Fˆ(x) is the value F(x).
An important feature of the randomized encoding Fˆ(x) is that it hides the specific names of
the gates being applied in a circuit F, and only reveals the topology of the circuit F. This feature
automatically implies the privacy of the randomized encoding: this means that it is not possible
to distinguish between the encoding of F on input x, or the encoding of a circuit E with the
same topology as F, but with all identity gates, with input F(x). In both cases, the decoding
process (which is a public procedure which does not require any secrets) produces the output F(x).
Thus, there is a canonical choice of simulator for such a randomized encoding: given input F(x),
it computes the randomized encoding Eˆ(F(x)), which is indistinguishable from the randomized
encoding Fˆ(x) via the circuit hiding property.
2.7 Another Simple QRE Using Group-Randomizing QRE
We note that it is possible to construct a simpler QRE scheme for circuits using the group-
randomizing QRE in different and arguably more straightforward manner. This construction
does not have the low complexity property, or the gate-by-gate encoding property as our main
construction presented above, but it is simpler and carries conceptual resemblance to classical
branching program RE via matrix randomization as the well known Kilian RE [Kil88].
The idea is to use the “magic state” representation of quantum circuits [BK05]. At a high level
and using the terminology of this work, [BK05] shows that any quantum circuit can be represented
(without much loss in size and depth) by a layered circuit as follows. Each layer consists of a
unitary Clifford circuit with two types of outputs. Some of the output qubits are passed to the
next layer as inputs (hence each layer has fewer inputs than its predecessor), and some of them
are measured and the resulting classical string determines the gates that will be applied in the
next layer (the last layer of course contains no measured qubits).12 The inputs to the first layer
consist of the input to the original circuit, and in addition some auxiliary qubits, each of which
is independently sampled from an efficiently samplable distribution over single-qubit quantum
states (called “magic state”).
Given ourmethodology above, one can straightforwardly come upwith aQRE for such circuits.
Given a circuit in the aforementioned layered form, and an input, the encoding is computed as
follows.
1. Generate the required number of magic states and concatenate them with the given input.
2. If the circuit contains only one layer, i.e. is simply a Clifford circuit, use group-randomizing
encoding (there is no need for classical RE in this case).
3. If the circuit contains more than one layer, consider the last layer (that produces the output),
we refer to the layer before last as the “predecessor layer”.
12In fact, the [BK05] characterization is muchmore specific about what the layers look like and only uses very specific
classical characterization, in particular eachmeasured bit controls one gate, but for our purposes even the above suffices.
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(a) Generate (classical) randomness that will allow to apply group-randomizing QRE on
the last layer (including decomposable classical RE of the classical part of the encoding).
This includes a randomizing Clifford R and randomness for classical RE.
(b) Modify the description of the predecessor layer so that instead of outputting its desig-
nated output, it essentially outputs the QRE of the last layer. Specifically, modify the
predecessor layer as follows. For the outputs that are passed to the next layer, add
an application of R before the values are actually output (since R is Clifford, the layer
remains a Clifford layer).
For the outputs that are to bemeasured, add aZ-twirl (i.e.Zs for a random s) followed by
a Clifford circuit that selects between the two labels of the classical RE of the following
(i.e. last) layer description. Also always output the (fixed classical) offline part of the
classical RE.
This transformation maintains the invariant that the new last layer (which is the aug-
mented predecessor layer) is a Clifford circuit where the identity of the gates is deter-
mined by a classical value that comes from predecessor layers.
(c) Remove the last layer from the circuit and continue recursively.
Correctness and security follow from those of the group-randomizing QRE and the Z-twirl.
While this QRE is not natively decomposable, it can be made decomposable by adding a single
layer of teleportation-based encoding (as in our full-fledged scheme) at the input. Interestingly, the
only quantum operation required in this QRE is an application of a random Clifford on the input
(more accurately, extended input containing the actual input and a number of auxiliary qubits in
a given fixed state).
One would be right to be concerned about whether the recursive process blows up the de-
scription of the layers. However, writing down the circuits carefully (e.g. not “wasting” gates on
constant values) and tracking of the parameters would show that the only blowup incurred is
the expected exponential in the depth, and this is only if information theoretically secure classical
RE is used. We tried to present the scheme in the a way that would make it easiest to verify its
correctness and security, an efficiency-oriented description would allow to encode all layers in
parallel, since the modification to each layer only depends on the randomness of the QRE of the
next layer, which can be sampled ahead of time.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notation
Registers. A register is a named Hilbert space Cd for some dimension d. We denote registers
using sans-serif font such as a, b, c, etc. Let w1,w2, . . . ,wn be a collection of registers. For a subset
S = {i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ [n], we write wS to denote the union of registers
⋃
i∈S wi. We write dim(a) to
denote the dimension of register a.
We also use underbrackets to denote the registers associated with a state, e.g.,
|ψ〉
a
, and
1√
2
∑
e
|e, e〉
vu
.
The first denotes a pure state |ψ〉 in the register a, and the second denotes an EPR pair on registers
vu, respectively.
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Quantum random variables. A quantum random variable (QRV) a on a register a is a density
matrix on register a. Note that we denote QRVs using bolded font. When referring to a collection
(a, b, c) of QRVs simultaneously, we are referring to the reduced density matrix of a global state on
the registers abc – we say that (a, b, c) is a joint QRV, which is also a QRV itself. We say that a QRV
a is independent of a collection of QRVs (b, c) if the density matrix corresponding to a is in tensor
product with the density matrix corresponding to (b, c).
Quantum operations. Given a quantum operation F mapping register a to register a′ and a
collection of QRVs (a, b), we write (F(a), b) to denote the a density matrix on registers a′b that is
the result of applying F to the density matrix (a, b). Given quantum operations F and G that act
on disjoint qubits, we write (F,G) to denote the product operation F ⊗ G. For a unitary U, we also
write U(x) as shorthand for U xU†.
Quantum circuits and their descriptions. Throughout this paper we will talk about quantum
circuits both as unitaries, and as classical descriptions of a sequence of gates. Formally, one is
an algebraic object and the other is a classical string (using some reasonable encoding format for
quantum circuits). To distinguish between the two presentationswe write Ĉkt to denote a classical
description of a circuit (i.e. a sequence of gates on some number of qubits), and use sans-serif font
such as Ckt to denote the corresponding unitary.
EPR pair. We let |EPR〉 denote the maximally entangled state on two qubits, i.e. 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉).
3.2 Distinguishability of Quantum Operations
LetD denote a set of distinguishers, i.e., a set of quantum operations. We say that two QRVs u, v of
the same dimension are (ε,D)-indistinguishable if
sup
h,D∈D
‖D(u ⊗ h) −D(v ⊗ h)‖1 6 ε
where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the trace distance, and the supremum is over arbitrary auxiliary quantum side
information h that is unentangled with either u and v, as well as distinguishers D ∈ D that can
take in input QRVs of the form u ⊗ h or v ⊗ h. We abbreviate this by writing
u ≈ε,D v.
The purpose of allowing side information h to appear is to make the distinguishability measure
behave nicely under tensoring with additional quantum states, as captured by the following
Lemma:
Lemma 3.1. Let D denote a set of distinguishers, and let u, v be QRVs of the same dimension such that
u ≈ε,D v. Then for all QRVs w, we have that
u ⊗ w ≈ε,D v ⊗ w.
Proof. Expanding out the definition, we have
sup
h,D∈D
‖D(u ⊗ w ⊗ h) −D(v ⊗ w ⊗ h)‖1 6 sup
h,D∈D
‖D(u ⊗ h) −D(v ⊗ h)‖1 6 ε (3.1)
where in themiddle expression the supremumover h includes supremizing over states of the form
w ⊗ h′. 
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3.3 Quantum Gates and Circuits
3.3.1 Pauli, Clifford, and PX Groups
Pauli Group. The single-qubit Pauli group P consists of the group generated by the following
Pauli matrices:
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
Y =
(
0 i
−i 0
)
Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
The n-qubit Pauli group Pn is the n-fold tensor product of P.
Clifford Group. The n-qubit Clifford group Cn is defined to be the set of unitaries C such that
CPnC† = Pn.
Elements of the Clifford group are generated by CNOT, Hadamard (H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
), and Phase
(P =
(
1 0
0 i
)
) gates.
The third level of the n-qubit Clifford hierarchy (Pauli and Clifford groups being the first and
second, respectively) are unitaries U where
UPnU† = Cn.
In other words, conjugating Paulis by U yield a Clifford element.
PX Group. The following subgroup of the Clifford group, which we call the PX-group, will be
of particular interest to us. The group is defined as a group of single-qubit unitaries, and can be
extended to multiple qubits by tensoring as usual. We define the single-qubit PX-group to be the
group generated by the Pauli X gate and Phase P gate.
The aforementioned P operation is the “square root” of the Pauli Z, so P2 = Z (and therefore
the Pauli group is a subgroup of the PX-group). The Pauli group is a strict subset of the PX-group
(since the Pauli group does not contain P), and the PX-group itself is a strict subgroup of the
single-qubit Clifford group (since the PX group does not contain the Hadamard gate).
Calculation shows that PX = iXP3, which implies that any element in the PX-group can be
written as icXaPb, where a ∈ {0, 1} and b, c ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. This immediately implies that given a
circuit that contains only I,X,P gates (and of course also Z = P2 gates which are equivalent to two
consecutive applications of P), it is possible to efficiently find its canonical representation as icXaPb.
We refer to such a circuit as a “PX circuit”. Given the canonical representation of a PX element,
it is possible to find a canonical PX circuit that implements the operation of the PX circuit. Since
the PX group is a group, applying a random PX operation on an arbitrary PX operation results
in a random PX operation. The extension to the multi-qubit setting is immediate by applying the
above qubit-by-qubit.
Conjugated PX Group. We also define a subgroup of the Clifford group called the conjugated PX
group (abbreviated CPX), which consists of the PX group conjugated by Hadamard gates. That is,
it is the group
{HGH : G ∈ PX}.
This also extends tomultiple qubits by tensoring. Note that the conjugated PX group also contains
the Pauli group.
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3.3.2 Universal Gate Set
A universal set of gates is C2 ∪ {T}, i.e. the set of two-qubit Clifford gates along with
T =
(
1 0
0 eiπ/4
)
.
The T gate is an example of a unitary from the third level of the Clifford hierarchy, as formalized
in the following fact.
Fact 3.2. For all a, b ∈ {0, 1} it holds that TXaZb = PaXaZbT.
3.3.3 Classical Circuits
Here we briefly review classical circuits. A classical circuit topology T consists of a directed acyclic
graph (DAG)where the nodes are divided into input terminals, placeholder gates, and output terminals.
Input terminals have in-degree 0 and arbitrary out-degree (i.e. they are source nodes). Output
terminals have in-degree 1 and out-degree 0 (i.e. they are sink nodes). Placeholder gates have
constant in-degree and out-degree (without loss of generality this constant can be 2while incurring
only a constant blowup in size and depth compared to any other constant). A classical circuit C
with topology T is simply an assignment of boolean functionalities to the placeholder gates.
The depth of a circuit is simply the length of the longest path from an input terminal to an
output terminal. The size of a circuit is the number of wires (i.e. edges) in the circuit topology.
An important class of circuits are constant-depth circuits. These are captured by the complexity
classNC0, which technically consists of function families { fn} that can be computed by a family of
polynomial-size circuits whose depth is bounded by a constant (i.e. does not grow with n). As we
shall see in Section 3.4, the classNC0 captures the complexity of encoding in classical randomized
encoding schemes.
3.3.4 Quantum Circuits and Their Topology
Circuit Topology. A quantum circuit topology T is a tuple (B,I,O,W, inwire, outwire,Z,T )
where
1. GT = (B ∪ I ∪ O,W) forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where the vertex set consists of
the union of disjoint sets B, I, O, and the edge set isW.
2. The set of edgesW are called wires of the circuit topologyT.
3. The set I is ordered, and consist of input terminals, and have in-degree 0, and out-degree 1.
Throughout this paper we will overload notation and let I denote the subset of wires W
that are incident to the input terminals.
4. The set O is ordered, and consist of output terminals, and have in-degree 1, and out-degree
0. Throughout this paper we will overload notation and let O denote the subset of wiresW
that are incident to the output terminals.
5. The vertices B are called placeholder gates, and for every 1 ∈ B, the in-degree and out-degree
of 1 are equal. We let p1 denote the degree, which we call the arity of the placeholder gate 1.
6. For every 1 ∈ B, we let inwire(1) denote an ordering of the wires w ∈ W that enter 1, and
let outwire(1) denote an ordering of the wires that exit 1.
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7. The setZ is a subset of I that denotes zero qubits (i.e. qubits to initialize in the state |0〉).
8. T ⊆ O denotes the set of discarded qubits (i.e. output qubits to trace out).
A topology thus specifies a quantum circuit in a natural way, except only “placeholder gates”
are specified. Note that the number of input terminals must be equal to the number of output
terminals; these correspond to the input and output wires of the circuit topology. We often let
n denote the number of input (and therefore output) terminals. Furthermore, a circuit topology
allows some input qubits to be initialized in the |0〉 state, and some output qubits to be traced out.
Given a topologyT , we define an evaluation order π : B → |B| to be a topological ordering of
the “blank gates”.
Quantum Circuits. A general quantum circuit F is a pair (T,G) where T =
(B,I,O,W, inwire, outwire,Z,T ) is a circuit topology and G is a set of unitaries such that for
every 1 ∈ B, there is a corresponding p1-qubit unitary U1 ∈ G. We often write 1 ∈ G to denote the
unitary itself. The size of a unitary circuit C is the number of wires |W|. For an (n− |Z|)-qubit state
w supported on the qubits not indexed byZ, we write F(w) to denote the density matrix resulting
from applying the gates 1 ∈ G to (w, 0) where the qubits indexed byZ are set to |0〉, and at the end
the qubits indexed by T are traced out.
A unitary quantum circuit C is a circuit where the set Z = T = ∅. In other words, it maps n
qubits to n qubits, and no qubits are discarded at the end.
By the Stinespring dilation theorem, every quantum operation can be realized as a general
quantum circuit. We associate the complexity of a quantum operationwith the size of the quantum
circuit that implements it, with respect to a universal set of gates. For this work, we choose to
work with the universal set C2 ∪ {T} as described in Section 3.3.2.
Constant-Depth Quantum Circuits. The main model of constant-depth quantum circuits that
we consider in this paper are QNC0f circuits, which are constant-depth circuits consisting of one-
or two-qubit gates, as well as fan-out gates of arbitrary arity, which copy a control qubit to a
number of target qubits (i.e., a fan-out gate with fan-out k performs the following transformation:
|x, y1, . . . , yk〉 7→ |x, y1 ⊕ x, y2 ⊕ x, . . . , yk ⊕ x〉). This is a natural analogue of classicalNC0 circuits, yet
is surprisingly powerful: functions such as PARITY can be computed in this model [Moo99, HS05].
We will show that QNC0f captures the complexity of the encoding procedures of our quantum
randomized encoding scheme.
3.4 Classical Randomized Encoding
We define classical randomized encoding schemes and their properties. See survey by Apple-
baum [App17] for details and references.
Definition 3.3 (Classical Randomized Encoding). Let f ∈ {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be some function. The
function fˆ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}t → {0, 1}m′ is a classical randomized encoding (CRE) of f if there exist a
deterministic function Dec (called a decoder) and a randomized function Sim (called a simulator)
with the following properties.
• Correctness. For all x, r it holds that f (x) = Dec( fˆ (x; r)).13
13This is known as perfect correctness and is the only notion of correctness considered in this work.
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• ε-Privacy (against a class of distinguishersD). For all x and for all D ∈ D it holds that∣∣∣∣P
r
[D( fˆ (x; r)) = 1] − P[D(Sim( f (x)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ 6 ε
where the second probability is over the randomness of the simulator Sim. The case of ε = 0
is called perfect privacy.
The encoding fˆ is a decomposable CRE (DCRE) of f if there exist functions fˆoff(r) (called the offline
part of the encoding) and labi,b(r) (called the label functions) for all i ∈ [n], b ∈ {0, 1}, such that for all
(x, r), fˆ (x, r) = ( fˆoff(r), (labi,xi(r))i∈[n]).
Note that as presented in Definition 3.3, there is no requirement that the randomized encoding
fˆ can be efficiently computed from the original function f . Furthermore, the decoder Dec and
simulatorSim are technically allowed to dependarbitrarily on the function f be encoded. However,
it is a highly desirable feature that randomized encodings be efficiently computable given a
description of f , and also have a universality property (see, e.g., Section 7.6.2 of [App14b]), where
the encoding fˆ (x) hides information not just about the input x, but also about the function f . This
is formalized by requiring that the decoding and simulation procedures depend only partially on
f . In many cases, including in this work, they should only depend on the topology of the circuit
computing f (see Section 3.3.3 for an overview of classical circuit topology). This motivates the
following general definition.
Definition 3.4 (Universal RE Schemes for Circuits). Let C denote a class of circuits and let R
denote an equivalence relation over C. An efficient R-universal RE scheme for the class C is a tuple of
polynomial-time algorithms (Enc,Dec,Sim) such that given a circuit f ∈ C (here we identify the
circuit with the function it computes),
• Efficient Encoding. For all x, r, Enc( f, x; r) computes a randomized encoding fˆ (x; r).
• Correctness. For all x and r it holds that f (x) = Dec(c, fˆ (x; r)) where c denotes the equivalence
class of f in R.
• ε-Privacy (against a class of distinguishersD). For all x and D ∈ D it holds that∣∣∣∣P
r
[D( fˆ (x; r)) = 1] − P[D(Sim(c, f (x)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ 6 ε .
where c denotes the equivalence class of f in R.
Furthermore, we say that theR-universal RE scheme (Enc,Dec,Sim) is decomposable if the random-
ized encoding fˆ (x; r) is decomposable, and furthermore we say that it is label-universal if the label
functions labi,b(r) only depend on the equivalence class of f in R.
Remark 3.5 (Universal RE and Universal Circuits). For many classes of functions it is possible
to achieve universality for RE using the notion of a universal circuit (or machine). If the class of
functions admits a universal circuit (which depends on a property such as the topology but takes
the remainder of the description as input), and this universal circuit itself belongs to the class
that can be encoded using the RE scheme, then one can apply the RE to the universal circuit and
consider the description of f as additional input to the circuit. This will result in a universal RE
scheme, and if the original RE was decomposable then the resulting scheme will be decomposable
with respect to both the input and the description of the function.
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Remark 3.6. In the case of computational security, the RE scheme (Enc,Dec,Sim) may also depend
on a security parameter λ. Since the security parameter will always be set and fixed in application,
we do not explicitly point it out in our notation.
For the remainder of this paper, when we speak of encoding a function f , we are referring to
encoding a specific circuit implementation of f (see Section 3.3.3). Furthermore, in this paperwewill
be focused on topologically-universal RE schemes – in other words, the equivalence relation R is such
that two circuits f, f ′ are equivalent if they have the same topology (i.e. the same interconnection
between gates, but possibly different gate functionality). Randomized encoding schemes in the
literature are typically topologically-universal (for example Yao’s garbled circuits scheme).
We note that label universality can be derived from R-universality in a generic way (essen-
tially by using a straightforward label-universal encoding of the multiplexer functions), but the
constructions we cite from the literature will have this property even without this transformation.
ExistingDecomposableClassical RESchemes. WeusedecomposableCRE (DCRE) as a building
block for our construction of quantum RE. In particular we rely on the following information
theoretical and computational schemes [BMR90, Rog91, App17].
Theorem 3.7 (Information Theoretic DRE). There exists an efficient topologically-universal (and label-
universal) DRE scheme for the class of all classical circuits with the following properties. For every (classical)
circuit f with depth d and s output bits, the following holds.
• Efficiency. The functions fˆoff(r) and labi,b(r) (and therefore also fˆ ) are computable in time poly(2
d) · s
(and thus this is an upper bound on the length of the labels). The running time of Dec and Sim is
also poly(2d) · s.
• Perfect Information-Theoretic Privacy. Perfect privacy against the class of all distinguishers.
• Locality. Every output bit of fˆ depends on at most 4 bits of (x, r).
We note that the locality and efficiency properties of the DRE scheme specified by Theorem 3.7
implies that the randomized encodings fˆ (x; r) are computable by NC0 circuits that take as input x
and the randomness r.
Theorem 3.8 (Computational DRE). Assume there exists a length doubling pseudorandom generator
(PRG) G that is secure against polynomial time classical (respectively quantum) adversaries.
Letλ denote the security parameter. There exists an efficient topologically-universal (and label-universal)
DRE scheme (Encλ,Decλ,Simλ) for the class of all classical circuits, such that the encoding of any ensemble
of functions { fλ}λ s.t. fλ is computable by a (classical) circuit of size s = poly(λ) has the following properties.
• Efficiency. For all fλ, the encoding fˆoff and labi,b (and therefore also fˆ ) are computable in time
poly(λ) · s. Specifically, each labi,b is of length poly(λ) (independent of s). The running time of Decλ
and Simλ is also poly(λ) · s.
• Computational Privacy. For every polynomial p, there exists a negligible function ε s.t. for all λ,
Encλ( fλ) is ε-private with respect to the class of p(λ)-size classical (resp. quantum) circuits.
• Locality. Every output bit of fˆ depends on at most 4 bits either of its input, or in the case of fˆoff,
also of the PRG applied to the input.14 If the PRG can be computed by log(λ)-depth circuit, then it is
possible to reduce the locality of fˆ (in its actual inputs) to 4 (via non-black-box use of the PRG).
14In particular, the PRG is used in a black-box manner.
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We note that the locality and efficiency properties of the DRE scheme specified by Theorem 3.8
implies that the randomized encodings fˆ (x; r) are computable byNC0 circuits that take as input x,
the randomness r, and the output of the PRG G.
4 Quantum Randomized Encoding – Definition and Existence
4.1 Quantum Randomized Encoding
We recall the definition of (decomposable) classical randomized encoding from Section 3.4. We
propose the following quantum analogue.
Definition 4.1 (Quantum Randomized Encoding). Let D be a class of distinguishers. Let F be a
quantum operation. The quantum operation Fˆ is a quantum randomized encoding (QRE) of F if there
exist quantum operationsDec (called the decoder) and Sim (called the simulator) with the following
properties.
• Correctness. For any quantum state (x, y), it holds that (Dec(Fˆ(x)), y) = (F(x), y).
• ε-Privacy (against a class of distinguishersD). For all quantum states (x, y), we have
(Fˆ(x), y) ≈ε,D (Sim(F(x)), y) .
The case of ε = 0 is called perfect privacy.
The encoding Fˆ is a decomposable QRE (DQRE) if there exists a quantum state e (called the resource
state of the encoding), an operation Fˆoff (called the offline part of the encoding) and a collection of input
garbling operations Fˆ1, . . . , Fˆn such that for all inputs x = (x1, . . . , xn),
Fˆ(x) =
(
Fˆoff, Fˆ1, Fˆ2, . . . , Fˆn
)
(x, r, e)
where r is a classical random string, the functions Fˆoff, Fˆ1, . . . , Fˆn act on disjoint subsets of qubits
from e, x (but possibly non-disjoint bits from r), and furthermore each Fˆi acts on a single qubit xi
(and Fˆoff does not act on any of the qubits of x).
One can see that this definition of quantum randomized encoding is syntactically similar to
Definition 3.3, with a couple differences. First, the correctness and privacy properties involves
the pair (x, y). We refer the reader to Section 3.1 for the full explanation of the quantum random
variable notation; but in short (x, y) represents a bipartite density matrix with an x part, and a y
part, and these partsmay be entangled. The y part is never acted upon by the decoder or simulator,
but distinguishability is measured with respect to the encoding of x as well as y, which we think
of as quantum side information. In other words, correlations between the input and an external
system are preserved through the encoding, decoding, and simulation.
A second difference involves the definition of decomposable QRE. In addition to receiving
a random string r, the randomized encoding also receives a auxiliary quantum state e (that is
independent of the input x). The definition allows for any resource state e, but in this paper we
focus on decomposable QREs where the resource state e is a collection of EPR pairs, which is
perhaps the most natural quantum analogue of a randomness string.
Furthermore, similar to the classical setting, it is highly desirable to have efficient QRE schemes
that are universal with respect to some property of the quantum operations being encoded, say
the topology of some circuit implementation of them. This motivates the following definition of
universal QRE scheme, in analogy to Definition 3.4.
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Definition 4.2 (Universal QRE Schemes for Circuits). Let C denote a class of general quantum
circuits15 and let R denote an equivalence relation over C. An efficient R-universal QRE scheme for
the class C is a tuple of polynomial-time quantum algorithms (Enc,Dec,Sim) such that given a
circuit F ∈ C (here we identify the circuit with the function it computes),
• Efficient Encoding. For all quantum states (x, y), Enc(F, x) computes a randomized encoding
Fˆ(x).
• Correctness. For all quantum states (x, y) it holds that (F(x), y) = (Dec(c, Fˆ(x)), y) where c
denotes the equivalence class of F in R.
• ε-Privacy (against a class of distinguishers D). For all quantum states (x, y) and D ∈ D it
holds that
(Fˆ(x), y) ≈ε,D (Sim(c, F(x)), y)
where c denotes the equivalence class of F in R.
Furthermore, we say that the R-universal QRE scheme (Enc,Dec,Sim) is decomposable if the ran-
domized encoding Fˆ(x) is decomposable and if the input garbling operations Fˆi only depend on
the equivalence class of F in R.
For the remainder of this paper, when we speak of encoding a quantum operation F, we are
referring to encoding a specific circuit implementation of F. Furthermore, in this paper we will
be focused on topologically-universal QRE schemes – in other words, the equivalence relation R is
such that two circuits F, F′ are equivalent if they have the same topology (see Section 3.3.4 for the
definition of quantum circuit topology).
4.2 Our Result: Existence of Decomposable Quantum Randomized Encodings
Ourmain result is an efficient topologically-universal decomposableQRE scheme. Weuse classical
decomposable RE as a building block.
Lemma 4.3 (Main Lemma). Suppose there exists an efficient topologically-universal (and label-universal)
classical DRE scheme CRE such that for functions f computable by size s, depth d classical circuits, the
complexity of encoding f is c(d, s) and the length of the labels is κ(d, s). Furthermore, assume that CRE has
ε-privacy against the class of distinguishers D of size S general quantum circuits.
Define recursively κ0 = O(1), κi = κ(O(1),O(κi−1)), and define ci = c(O(1),O(κi−1)). (All the O(·)’s
refer to global constants that are independent of f or the DRE scheme.)
Then there exists an efficient topologically-universal decomposable QRE scheme QRE for all quantum
circuits, such that for any F with a circuit of depth d and size s, the randomized encoding Fˆ has the following
properties.
• Efficiency. The functions Fˆi (and therefore also Fˆ itself) are computable by aQNC
0
f circuit (that only
has a single layer of fan-out gates) applied to a string of random bits, a collection of EPR pairs, and the
output of the encoding and label functions of CRE. The offline part Fˆoff has complexity O(cd · s). The
online parts Fˆi for i > 0 have complexity O(κd). The running time of Dec and Sim are polynomial
in the complexity of encoding procedure. Furthermore, if an input qubit xi is classical then the input
garbling operation Fˆi is computable by a classical circuit.
15See Section 3.3.4 for the definition of general quantum circuits.
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• Privacy. The QRE has O(ε · s)-privacy against the class of quantum circuits of size at most
S − poly(cd) · s.
Remark 4.4. Asmentioned in Remark 3.5, we can apply our encoding scheme to a universal circuit
of some class of circuit (say the class of circuits with a given topology) rather than to F itself, and
consider the classical description of F as an additional input. This would incur some overhead due
to the blowup of the universal circuit but will have properties that may be useful in some settings.
In particular, the dependence of the encoding on the description of F becomes very simple and
since the description is classical it also becomes classical. Furthermore, if the input x is classical as
well, then the quantum part of the encoding Fˆ(x) is independent of both F, x and can be generated
beforehand as a “resource state” that is given to the encoder.
The proof of Lemma 4.3 is enclosed in Sections 5 and 6. Specifically, Section 5 describes a
procedure that takes a general quantum circuit and computes the randomized encoding of the
function computed by this circuit, and the decoding procedure. It also proves the efficiency
properties of these procedures. Correctness and simulation security are then analyzed in Section 6.
Combining Lemma 4.3 with properties of existing classical RE schemes from Theorem 3.7 and
Theorem 3.8, respectively, the following theorems immediately follow.
Theorem 4.5 (Information Theoretic DQRE). There exists an efficient topologically-universal decompos-
able QRE scheme (Enc,Dec,Sim) for the class of all quantum circuits, such that for any F with a circuit of
depth d and size s, the randomized encoding Fˆ has the following properties.
• Efficiency. The functions Fˆi (and therefore also Fˆ itself) are computable via a QNC
0
f circuit (that
only has a single layer of fan-out gates) applied to a string of random bits and a collection of EPR
pairs. The size of the circuit is poly(2d) · s. The running time of Dec and Sim are also poly(2d) · s.
Furthermore, if some input qubit xi is classical then the input garbling operation Fˆi is computable by
a classical circuit.
• Perfect Information-Theoretic Privacy. Perfect privacy against the class of all distinguishers.
Proof. Plugging the properties of the DCRE scheme from Theorem 3.7 into the conditions of
Lemma 4.3, we get κi = poly(2
i), ci = poly(2
i) and of course ε = 0 for the class of all distinguishers.
The result thus follows. 
Theorem 4.6 (Computational DRE). Assume there exists a length doubling pseudorandom generator
(PRG) G that is secure against polynomial-size quantum adversaries.
Let λ denote the security parameter. Then there exists an efficient topologically-universal decomposable
QRE scheme (Encλ,Decλ,Simλ) for the class of all quantum circuits, such that for any ensemble of quantum
operations {Fλ}λ where Fλ has size s = poly(λ), the following holds.
• Efficiency. The functions Fˆi (and therefore also Fˆ itself) are computable via aQNC
0
f circuit (that only
has a single layer of fan-out gates) applied to a string of random bits, a collection of EPR pairs, and the
output of the PRG on parts of the randomness string.16 The size of Fˆoff is poly(λ) · s and the size of Fˆi
for i > 0 is poly(λ). The running time of Decλ and Simλ are also poly(λ) · s. Furthermore, if some
input qubit xi is classical then the input garbling operation Fˆi is computable by a classical circuit.
16As in the classical case, the PRG is used in a classical and black-box manner. If we allow non-black-box use of the
PRG and if it can be computed by log(λ)-depth circuit, then the encoding can be made fully inQNC0f .
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• Computational Privacy. For every polynomial q, there exists a negligible function ε such that for
all λ, Encλ(Fλ) is ε-private with respect to the class of q(λ)-size quantum circuits.
Proof. Plugging the properties of the DCRE scheme from Theorem 3.8 into the conditions of
Lemma 4.3, we get κi = poly(λ), ci = poly(λ). Since ε-privacy for a negligible ε holds for any
polynomial p, we can consider p(λ) = q(λ) + poly(λ) · s, and obtain the privacy result. 
5 Quantum Randomized Encoding Scheme
In this sectionwe present our topologically-universalQRE for quantum circuits, and consequently
establish Lemma 4.3. In particular, given a circuit that computes a quantum operation F, we show
how to compute the encoding Fˆ in Section 5.3, how to decode the encoded value in Section 5.5,
and how to simulate the randomized encoding in Section 5.6. We then prove the correctness and
security of the scheme in Section 6.
In this paper we assume that quantum circuits F being encoded use the universal gate set
C2 ∪ {T}. The only property of this gate set we use (other that the arity of the gates being bounded
by a global constant) is the following: each p-qubit gateU1 of circuit F has the property that for any
single-qubit Pauli unitaries P1, . . . ,Pp, there exist single-qubit gates R1, . . . ,Rp from the PX group
(defined in Section 3.3.1) such that
U1(P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pp) = (R1 ⊗ R2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Rp)U1. (5.1)
This property indeed holds for the C2 ∪ {T} universal set as described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
A Building Block: Topologically-Universal Decomposable RE for (Classical) Circuits. We use
an efficient topologically-universal (and label-universal) DCRE for circuits as specified in the
statement of Lemma 4.3. We refer to this DCRE scheme as CRE. In our construction we use CRE
as a generic building block, and different instantiations of CRE will result in quantum encoding
scheme with different properties. As in the lemma statement, we let κ(·, ·) and c(·, ·) be such that
for functions f computable by classical circuits of size s and depth d, the complexity of encoding
f via CRE is c(d, s) and the length of the labels is κ(d, s). We let CSimT and CDecT denote the
polynomial-time simulator and decoding procedures of CRE, respectively, for classical circuits
with topology T.
RandomizationUnitaries. Wewill use randomelements form the conjugated PX groupCPX (see
Section 3.3.1) as randomization unitaries. It will therefore be convenient to set a shorthand notation
for the elements of the k-qubit CPX group as follows. We let Rk denote the set of k-qubit CPX
group elements.
5.1 Gadgets
In this section we introduce various gadgets that are used in our quantum randomized encoding
scheme.
5.1.1 Teleportation Gadget
Let ℓ = (ℓb,a)a∈{0,1},b∈{x,z} be a vector of strings of length κ, and let s = (sz, sx), t = (tz, tx) ∈ {0, 1}2.
Define TPℓ,s,t to be the unitary computed by the following circuit:
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u • H • Z(sz) X(tz)
z / X(ℓz,0) X(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1)
x / X(ℓx,0) X(ℓx,0 ⊕ ℓx,1)
v • Z(sx) X(tx)
Figure 1: Teleportation gadget
Here, for a string r ∈ {0, 1}κ the notation X(r) denotes applying the tensor product of X gates
acting on the i-th qubit whenever ri = 1, and identity otherwise. The controlled X(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1) and
X(ℓx,0⊕ℓx,1) gates can also be seen as fan-out gates that are applied to the qubits indexed by ℓz,0⊕ℓz,1
and ℓx,0⊕ ℓx,1, respectively, because it copies the control qubit into the target qubits simultaneously.
Thus the teleportation gadget is a QNC0f circuit. We refer to ℓ as the teleportation labels and s, t as
the randomization bits of the teleportation gadget TPℓ,s,t.
Lemma 5.1. Let u, v, u′ denote qubit registers, and let z, x denote ancilla registers. For all ℓ, s, t and for all
qubit states |ψ〉 we have
TPℓ,s,t |ψ〉
u
⊗ |0, 0〉
zx
⊗ |EPR〉
vu′
=
1
2
∑
d,e∈{0,1}
XtzZsz |d〉
u
⊗ XtxZsx |e〉
v
⊗ |ℓz,d, ℓx,e〉
zx
⊗ XeZd|ψ〉
u′
Proof. Since TPℓ,s,t is unitary, it suffices to prove the Lemmawhen |ψ〉 = |c〉 is a standard basis state.
After the first CNOT, Hadamard, and X(ℓz,0) and X(ℓx,0) we have
1
2
∑
d,a∈{0,1}
(−1)dc|d〉
u
⊗ |ℓz,0〉
z
⊗ |ℓx,0〉
x
⊗ |a ⊕ c, a〉
vu′
.
After the controlled X’s we have
1
2
∑
d,a∈{0,1}
(−1)dc|d〉
u
⊗ |ℓz,d〉
z
⊗ |ℓx,a⊕c〉
x
⊗ |a ⊕ c, a〉
vu′
.
After the Z gates we have
1
2
∑
d,a∈{0,1}
(−1)d(c⊕sz)(−1)(a⊕c)sx |d〉
u
⊗ |ℓz,d〉
z
⊗ |ℓx,a⊕c〉
x
⊗ |a ⊕ c, a〉
vu′
.
Relabeling e = a ⊕ c and re-arranging, we get
1
2
∑
d,e∈{0,1}
Zsz |d〉
u
⊗ Zsx |e〉
v
⊗ |ℓz,d, ℓx,e〉
zx
⊗ XeZd|c〉
u′
.
By applying the X(tz) and X(tx) gates, we obtain the desired Lemma statement.

5.1.2 Correction Gadget
We introduce a correction gadget, which serves two purposes. First, to apply corrections that come
from applying a gate (Clifford or T gate) to a one-time padded input. Second, to switch the order
between applying a PX correction and teleporting a qubit. That is, instead of applying some PX
operation to a qubit and then teleporting it, we will be able to first teleport and apply a (different)
correction after the fact. This order-switching is captured by the following Lemma.
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Lemma 5.2. Let ℓ be κ-bit teleportation labels, and let s, t ∈ {0, 1}2 be randomization bits. Let R be an
element from the single-qubit PX group (see Section 3.3.1). Let A be an arbitrary unitary. Then the following
circuit identity holds:
u R
TPℓ,s,t
u
TPℓ,s,t A CorrA,R,ℓ,s,ta / = a /
v v
where the unitary CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t (called a correction gadget) is computed by the following circuit:
u
A†
Ru
a / Ra
v Rv
where Ru,Ra,Rv are elements of the conjugated PX group (and are thus a tensor product of single-qubit
unitaries). Furthermore, the unitaries Ru,Ra,Rv depend only on R, ℓ, s, and t.
Proof. Note that it suffices to prove this Lemma for the case that A = I (because A cancels itself
out).
Since R is an element of the single-qubit PX group, we can write R = iaXbPc for a ∈ {0, 1},
b, c ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} where P is the phase gate. We prove this Lemma by considering three cases: R is
an element of the Pauli group, R has the form Pc, and R is a general PX group element.
Case 1. We first consider the case that R is an element of the Pauli group. Notice that T̂Pℓ,s,t is a
Clifford circuit, so
TPℓ,s,t (R ⊗ I) = (Ru ⊗ Ra ⊗ Rv)TPℓ,s,t
where Ru,Rv are single-qubit unitaries from the Pauli group, and Ra are 2κ-qubit Pauli unitaries.
These Paulis depend on ℓ, s, t and R. Note that Pauli group elements belong to the conjugated PX
group. This establishes the Lemma in the case that R is an element of the Pauli group.
Case 2. Now we analyze the case that R has the form Pc. First, we record the following Fact,
which can be verified via direct calculation.
Fact 5.3. Let R =
[
1 0
0 eiθ
]
be a general phase gate for some θ ∈ [0, 2π). Then the following circuit identity
holds. If the second wire represents κ qubits, then for r ∈ {0, 1}κ, we have
H R H • = • H R H
/ X(r) / H R†(r) H
where R†(r) denotes the tensor product
⊗
j(R
†)r j , i.e., on the j-th qubit, applies R† if r j = 1 and applies the
identity otherwise.
We exhibit a sequence of equivalent circuits. Since we R = Pc is a (power of a) phase gate, it
commutes with the control of the first CNOT gate of the teleportation circuit. Thus we can restrict
our attention to analyzing the first two wires of the teleportation circuit after the first CNOT gate:
u Pc H • Zsz Xtz
z / X(ℓz,0) X(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1)
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which, by applying Fact 5.3, yields
u H • H Pc H Z(sz) X(tz)
z / X(ℓz,0) X(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1) H P−c(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1) H
By commuting the Zsz and Xtz gates past the HPcH, we get
u H • Z(sz) X(tz) H i−cszPc H
z / X(ℓz,0) X(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1) H P−c(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1) H
where we used the fact that XtzZszHPcH = H(i−cszPc)HXtzZsz (which can be verified via direct
calculation):
XtzZszHPcH = HZtzXszPcH (5.2)
= HZtz(i−cszPc)XszH (5.3)
= H(i−cszPc)ZtzXszH (5.4)
= H(i−cszPc)HXtzZsz (5.5)
Notice that the left half of this circuit (before the column of Hadamards) is exactly the top half of
the T̂Pℓ,s,t circuit, followed by elements of the conjugated PX group. Thus the statement of the
Lemma is proved by setting
Ru = H(i
−cszPc)H (5.6)
Ra = Rz ⊗ Rx (5.7)
Rv = I (5.8)
where
Rz = H
⊗κP−c(ℓz,0 ⊕ ℓz,1)H⊗κ Rx = I
Here, Rz acts on register z and Rx acts on register x. Note that Ru,Ra,Rv are all conjugated PX
group elements.
Case 3. Finally we consider the case that R = iaXbPc is a general element of the PX group. We can
combine the two cases above:
TPℓ,s,t (i
aXbPc ⊗ I) (5.9)
= ia
(
Qu ⊗Qa ⊗Qv
)
·
(
TPℓ,s,t
)
·
(
Pc ⊗ I
)
(5.10)
= ia
(
Qu ⊗Qa ⊗Qv
)
·
(
Ju ⊗ Ja ⊗ Jv
)
·
(
TPℓ,s,t
)
(5.11)
=
(
Ru ⊗ Ra ⊗ Rv
)
·
(
TPℓ,s,t
)
(5.12)
In the second line we moved the Xb past the teleportation gadget and the Qu,Qa,Qv are all Pauli
group elements. In the third line we moved the Pc past the teleportation gadget and the Ju, Ja, Jv
are the unitaries specified in Equation (5.6), (5.7), and (5.8), respectively. In the fourth line we let
Ru,Ra,Rv denote the conjugated PX group elements such that
Ru = i
aQuJu, Ra = QaJa, Rv = QvJv.

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Canonical Representations of the Correction Gadget. We will only use correction gadgets
CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t where A is an element of the randomization group R2κ+2 (which is the conjugated
PX group). Assume that A = Au ⊗ Aa ⊗ Av where Aa = Az,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Az,κ ⊗ Ax,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ax,κ. In this
case, CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t decomposes into the tensor product
(RuAu) ⊗ (Rz,1Az,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ (Rx,κAx,κ) ⊗ (RvAv)
where Ru,Rz,1, . . . ,Rx,κ,Rv are all single-qubit conjugated PX group elements. Thus, the correction
gadget CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t is a member of the (multi-qubit) conjugated PX group, and the canonical repre-
sentation of ĈorrA,R,ℓ,s,t whenA comes from the randomization group R2κ+2 is a single-layer circuit
consisting of a tensor product of conjugated PX group unitaries.
Furthermore, then for every κ-bit teleportation labels ℓ, randomization bits s, t ∈ {0, 1}2, and
single-qubit R from the PX group, for a uniformly random A drawn from R2κ+2, the correction
gadget is ĈorrA,R,ℓ,s,t is uniformly distributed over the set of all (2κ + 2)-qubit correction gadgets.
The following claim asserts that the correction gadget can be computed in the complexity class
NC0 by a constant depth classical circuit.17
Claim 5.4. Let R be a single-qubit PX group element, and let A ∈ R2κ+2 for some value κ. The classical
function that takes as input A, R, ℓ, s, and t and outputs a classical description of the correction gadget
ĈorrA,R,ℓ,s,t is computable in NC
0, the circuit size is O(κ).
Proof. Consider the circuit computing the part of CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t that acts on register u. This requires
computing the unitary Ru, which in turn requires computing the unitaries Qu and Ju as described
at the end of the proof of Lemma 5.2. The unitaryQu comes frommoving X
b past the teleportation
gadget, and only depends on the value of b, sz, tz. The unitary Ju, which comes from moving P
c
past the teleportation gadget, is specified by Equation (5.6), and is a function of c and sz. Thus Ru
can be computed by a constant-depth circuit. The complexity of computing Rv is established in a
similar fashion.
Consider computing the part of CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t that acts on a single qubit subregister of a. This
component only depends on a constant number of bits from the input as follows.
1. The gate Rwhich is a single-qubit PX group element and thus described by 5 bits.
2. The respective single-qubit component of A, which is a single-qubit CPX group element and
thus described by 5 bits.
3. The bits of the respective {0, 1} labels from ℓ constitute 4 bits in total.
Therefore, every single qubit component of CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t, and therefore also CorrA,R,ℓ,s,t in its entirety,
can be computed in NC0. Importantly, the depth of the circuit is independent of κ, the length of
the labels. The size of the circuit is O(κ). 
5.1.3 Encrypted Pauli Gadget
For all κ ∈ N and for all κ-bit labels ℓ = (ℓb,a)b∈{x,z},a∈{0,1}, define the encrypted Pauli gadget PGℓ to be
the following unitary that is controlled on ancilla registers a = (z, x) where z, x are κ-qubit registers,
17In this circuit model, input bits have unbounded fan-out, but the rest of the circuit consists of AND, OR, NOT gates
with bounded fan-in and bounded fan-out.
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and has as target a qubit register u: for all d, e ∈ {0, 1}, we have
PGℓ
 |ℓz,d, ℓx,e〉
zx
⊗ |ψ〉
u
 = |ℓz,d, ℓx,e〉
zx
⊗ ZdXe|ψ〉
u
. (5.13)
In other words, ℓ specifies, for each b ∈ {x, z}, an encoding a 7→ ℓb,a of bits a ∈ {0, 1} into a label. The
unitary PGℓ decodes the label pair (ℓz,d, ℓx,e) into a pair of bits (d, e), and applies the corresponding
Pauli operation ZdXe on the qubit register u.
5.2 Encoding a Single Gate
We now present the gate encoding unitary GateEnc1,r,A,ℓ,s,t, depicted in Figure 2. This is used by the
quantum randomized encoding to encode each gate of the circuit.
The gate encoding unitary is a function of a p-qubit gate 1, a string r (which represents the ran-
domness used by the classical randomized encoding scheme), randomizationunitariesA = (A j) j∈[p]
with A j ∈ R2κ j+2 for some integer κ j, strings ℓ = (ℓ j,b,a) j∈[p],b∈{x,z},a∈{0,1} with ℓ j,b,a ∈ {0, 1}κ j (which
represents the teleportation labels), and randomization bits s = (s j,b) j∈[p],b∈{0,1}, t = (t j,b) j∈[p],b∈{0,1}. As
described at the beginning of this section, we assume that the gate 1 satisfes the property described
in Equation (5.1).
At a high level, the gate encoding produces a quantum and a classical part. The quantum
part is comprised of p “input qubits” u1, . . . , up, p ancilla qubits” a1, . . . , ap, and p “target” qubits
v1, . . . , vp. These target qubits are each supposed to be half of an EPR pair.
The gate 1 is first applied to the input qubits u. Then the teleportation gadget TP is applied to
(u, a, v), and then the randomization unitaries A j are applied to (u j, a j, v j) for j ∈ [p]. The effect of
this is to apply the gate to the input, teleport the result to the target qubits, and then randomize all
qubits using the A j’s.
However, since the input qubits will generally have been teleported from some previous gates,
the input qubits will have X and Z corrections on them, and applying the gate 1will incur further
corrections. The evaluator will have to undo these corrections themselves; they will use the
classical part of the gate encoding to do this. This classical part is a classical randomized encoding
of a correction function, which we describe next.
5.2.1 Correction Functions and Their Randomized Encoding
Consider a vector κ = (κ j) j∈[p]. Define the classical correction function fκ, which on input
(z1, x1, z2, x2, . . . , zp, xp, 1,A, ℓ, s, t) outputs a tuple of quantum circuits (Ĉorr1, Ĉorr2, . . . , Ĉorrp)where
Ĉorr j = ĈorrA j,R j,ℓ j,s j,t j for j ∈ [p] are the correction gadgets defined in Lemma 5.2. The unitaries
R1,R2, . . . ,Rp are the single-qubit PX unitaries satisfying
1(Zz1Xx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ZzpXxp) = (R†1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ R†p)1 .
The unitaries R1, . . . ,Rp are well-defined because 1 comes from our universal set of gates (two-
qubit Clifford and T gates). The correction gadgets Ĉorr j are specified using their canonical
representation (i.e., a depth-two circuit of single-qubit unitaries).
We now describe a classical circuit to compute fκ, by first describing the circuit to compute
Ĉorr j for a single j. As discused in Section 5.1.2, there is a constant-depth circuit of size O(κ j) to
compute Ĉorr j, and this circuit is a function of R j,A j, ℓ j, s j, t j. The unitary R j is itself a function of
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1 and the tuple (z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp). Since the universal gate set used in this paper has arity bounded
by 2 and has a constant number of elements, there is a constant-sized circuit that computes R j.
Composing this circuit with the circuit for Ĉorr j (Claim 5.4), we get a constant-depth circuit of size
O(κ j) that takes input 1, z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp,A j, ℓ j, s j, t j.
Putting everything together, we have a classical NC0 circuit, whose depth will be denoted a
universal constant dcorr and whose size is cκ = O(
∑
j κ j) that computes fκ. Note that the topology
of this circuit only depends on the vector κ; call this topology Tκ.
Now, consider the encoding fˆκ of fκ with respect to CRE, the DCRE scheme for classi-
cal circuits that we use as a blackbox. Since the scheme is decomposable, we have that
fˆκ(z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp, 1,A, ℓ, s, t; r) consists of an offline part fˆκ,off(r) that only depends on fκ, and an
online part which are labels for each input z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp, 1,A, ℓ, s, t. Let labκ(1,A, ℓ, s, t; r) denote
the set of labels encoding the inputs 1,A, ℓ, s, t.
Thus one can consider, for a fixed 1,A, ℓ, s, t the correction function f1,A,ℓ,s,t(z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp) =
fκ(z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp, 1,A, ℓ, s, t). The randomized encoding fˆκ is also a randomized encoding of
fˆ1,A,ℓ,s,t, where now the offline part fˆ1,A,ℓ,s,t,off(r) consists of both fˆκ,off(r) and labκ(1,A, ℓ, s, t; r). The
online part are labels for z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp; for each j ∈ [p], b ∈ {x, z}, and a ∈ {0, 1}, let labκ( j, b, a; r)
denote the label of the input variable b j when it takes value a, when the DCRE randomness is r
and the topology of the circuit is Tκ.
5.2.2 The Gate Encoding Unitary
We are now ready to present the gate encoding unitary GateEnc1,r,A,ℓ,s,t. It acts on QRVs u =
(u1, u2, . . . , up) (which represents the input qubits to the gate 1), a = (a1, . . . , ap) (which represent
the ancillas for the outgoing wires of gate 1), v = (v1, v2, . . . , vp) (which represents the entrance of
connecting EPR pairs), and c (which represents the classical randomized encoding of the correction
gadget).
GateEnc1,r,A,ℓ,s,t(u, a, v, c)
1. Update u ← 1(u).
2. Compute the quantum part of the group-randomizing QRE.
(a) For j ∈ [p], update (u j, a j, v j)← TPℓ j ,s j,t j(u j, a j, v j).
(b) For j ∈ [p], update (u j, a j, v j)← A j(u j, a j, v j).
3. Compute the classical part of the group-randomizing QRE.
(a) Compute classical randomized encoding of the correction function f1,A,ℓ,s,t as
defined in Section 5.2.1. Let fˆ1,A,ℓ,s,t,off(r) be the offline part of the randomized
encoding fˆ1,A,ℓ,s,t using CRE and randomness r. Initialize QRV c in the state
| fˆ1,A,ℓ,s,t,off(r)〉.
4. Output (u, a, v, c).
Figure 2: Gate encoding operation
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Complexity of the Gate Encoding. The gate encoding consists of a quantum part and a classical
part. The quantumpart is applying the gate 1, applying the teleportation gadget,and then applying
the randomizersA j. Since the teleportation gadget is aQNC
0
f circuit (with a single layer of fan-out
gates), and the randomizers is just a single layer of conjugated PX group elements, the quantum
encoding can be performed in QNC0f .
The classical part is computing the classical randomized encoding of the correction function
f1,A,ℓ,s,t, which has topology Tκ1 . The complexity of encoding f1,A,ℓ,s,t is inherited from the classical
RE used – if the encoding of CRE can be computed via aNC0 circuit, then the entire gate encoding
procedure can be computed in QNC0f .
5.3 Encoding a Circuit and Input
We now describe the encoding procedure Enc, which takes as input the description of an n-qubit
general quantum circuit F = (T ,G) and a n-qubit input x, and outputs the QRE Fˆ(x). LetZ and T
be the zero input qubits and discarded output qubits, respectively. For simplicity we assume that
Z is empty (the zero inputs can be incorporated into x).
The scheme is presented in Figure 3. We now discuss the details about the label lengths, and
the ancillary randomness and quantum random variables used in the encoding.
Label Lengths. Our quantum randomized encoding contains a classical encoding of a correction
function (see Section 5.2.1 for the definition of correction function) for every gate 1 in the circuit
using the scheme CRE. To keep track of the lengths of the labels and randomness required for the
sake of this encodingwe define, for every wirew ∈W in the circuit, a value κw that corresponds to
the label lengths for the encoding of thewirew, and for every gate 1 ∈ G a value c1 that corresponds
to the size of the randomized encoding of the correction function associated with 1.
For all output wires w ∈ O, define κw = 1. Then, we recursively define the wire label lengths,
moving backwards through the circuit. For every gate 1 ∈ Gwhose outputwires have label lengths
defined, let γ1 denote the vector γ1 = (κw′ : w
′ ∈ outwire(1)), which has the label lengths for all
the output wires of 1. Recall from Section 5.2.1 that the circuit with topology Tγ1 has depth dcorr
(which is a universal constant) and size σ1 = O(
∑
j κ j) where κ j is the label length of the j-th output
wire of 1. Thus the classical randomized encoding of a correction function f1,A,ℓ,s,t has complexity
c1 = c(dcorr, σ1), and the label lengths κ1 = κ(dcorr, σ1), where c(·, ·) and κ(·, ·) are as in the statement
of Lemma 4.3. For every incoming wire w ∈ inwire(1), let κw = κ1. We then recurse on the next
layer of gates.
The following observations will be useful for our analysis down the line. First, we note that the
encoding complexities c1 and the label lengths κw only depend on the topology T of the quantum
circuit F, and not on the actual unitaries of the gates. Second, as a recursive argument shows, if d
is the depth of the quantum circuit F then it holds that c1 6 cd and κ1 6 κd, where κd, cd are as in
the statement of Lemma 4.3.
Quantum and Classical RandomVariables. In addition to the input QRV x, the encoding proce-
dure Enc takes as input classical randomness and some ancilla QRVs. We first specify the ancilla
QRVs:
• For every wire w ∈ W, the two-qubit QRV ew = (ew
in
, ewout) is initialized in the state |EPR〉.
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• For every wire w ∈ W, the QRV aw is initialized to 2κw zeroes. These are the ancilla qubits
that are used to hold the labels of the teleportation measurements (see Section 5.1.1).
• For every gate 1 ∈ G, the QRV c1 is initialized to c1 zeroes. These are the ancilla qubits
that are uased to hold the description of the classical randomized encoding of the correction
functions (see Section 5.2).
• For every non-traced out output wire w ∈ O \ T , the QRV Dw is initialized to |0〉. These are
the qubits that hold the labels of the output wires, so the evaluator can decode.
The classical randomness is as follows:
• For every gate 1 ∈ G, the random string r1 is a uniformly random string of length c1. The
randomness is used for the classical randomized encodings of the correction functions.
• For every wire w ∈ W, the random stringAw is a random element of R2κw+2. In other words,
it is a tensor product of 2κw + 2 uniformly random conjugated PX group elements. These
randomizers are used in the encoding of each gate of the circuit.
• For every wire w ∈ W, sw is a random pair of bits (swz , swx ) ∈ {0, 1}2, and tw is a random pair
of bits (twz , t
w
x ) ∈ {0, 1}2. These values are used to randomize the teleportation measurements
(see Section 5.1.1).
• For every output wire w ∈ O, ow is a random pair of bits (owz , owx ). These values are used to
compute the labels of the output wires.
We let r = (r1)1∈G, A = (Aw)w∈W, s = (sw)w∈W , t = (tw)w∈W, o = (ow)w∈O, e = (ew)w∈W, a =
(aw)w∈W , c = (c1)1∈G, D = (Dw)w∈O\T . Note that, whereas in Section 5.2 the variables r,A, s, t refer to
p-tuples of random strings, in this Section, since we are analyzing the encoding of an entire circuit,
the variables r,A, s, t are indexed differently (either by the gate set G or the wire setW).
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Enc(F, x)
Randomness: r,A, s, t, o
EPR pairs: e
Zero ancillas: a, c,D
1. (Label setup). For all wires w ∈W:
(a) If w < O (i.e. it is not an output wire), then let 1, j be such that wire w
corresponds to the j-th input qubit of gate 1. Compute the labels ℓw =
(ℓw
b,a
)b∈{x,z},a∈{0,1} where ℓwb,a = labγ1( j, b, a; r
1) where labγ1 is the label function
corresponding to the CRE encoding of a classical circuit with topology Tγ1
(see Section 5.2.1 for more details).
(b) If w ∈ O, let ℓw
b,0
= ow
b
and ℓw
b,1
= ow
b
⊕ 1 for b ∈ {x, z}.
2. (Gate encoding). For all gates 1 ∈ G:
(a) Let (w1, . . . ,wp1) = inwire(1) denote the ordered sequence of wires leading
into 1, and let (w′
1
, . . . ,w′p1) = outwire(1) denote the ordered sequence of
wires leading out of 1.
(b) Let ℓ1 = (ℓw
′
1 , . . . , ℓ
w′p1 ), A1 = (Aw
′
1 , . . . ,A
w′p1 ), s1 = (sw
′
1 , . . . , s
w′p1 ), and t1 =
(tw
′
1 , . . . , t
w′p1 ) be the classical randomness associated with the output wires of
gate 1.
(c) Let u1 = (ew1out, . . . , e
wp
out), v
1 = (e
w′
1
in
, . . . , e
w′p1
in
), and a1 = (aw
′
1 , . . . , a
w′p1 ) be the
QRVs associated with the gate 1.
(d) Update (u 1, a 1, v 1, c 1)← GateEnc1,r1,A1,ℓ1,s1,t1(u 1, a 1, v 1, c 1).
3. (Input encoding). For q ∈ [n]:
(a) Let w ∈ W be the q-th input wire of F, and let xq denote the q-th input qubit.
(b) Update (xq, a
w, ew
in
)← TPℓw,sw,tw(xq, aw, ewin).
4. (Output key) For all non-traced out output wires w ∈ O \T , update Dw to be in the
state |ℓw
z,0
, ℓw
z,1
, ℓw
x,0
, ℓw
x,1
〉.
5. Output
(
(ew, aw)w∈W , (c1)1∈G , (Dw)w∈O\T
)
.
Figure 3: The quantum randomized encoding procedure given circuit F and input state x.
Complexity and Locality of the Encoding. We now argue that the QRE Fˆ of F has the claimed
complexity and locality properties. First, the QRE is decomposable: if we let J =
(
r,A, s, t, o
)
denote
a classical random string and let Q =
(
e, a, c,D
)
denote a quantum resource state, then we can
write
Fˆ(x; J,Q) = (Fˆoff(J,Q), Fˆ1(x1; J,Q), . . . , Fˆn(xn; J,Q)) .
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Here, Fˆoff(J,Q) is the offline part of the encoding that involves the Label Setup (Item 1), the Gate
Encoding (Item 2), and setting up the “label table” (Dw)w∈O\T that allows the evaluator to decode
the output wires (that are not traced out in the topology T). The Label Setup procedure can be
parallelized over all wires w ∈W, and its complexity is inherited from the complexity of the label
function of CRE. Since the complexity of computing each label is at most cd, where d is the depth
of F, then the complexity of the Label Setup is at most O(cd · |W|).
The Gate Encoding procedure can be parallelized over all gates 1 ∈ G, and its complexity is
discussed in Section 5.2.2. Since the complexity of the Gate Encoding procedure is at most O(cd),
then the complexity of the Gate Encoding procedure is at most O(cd · |G|). If the complexity of
the encoding procedure of CRE is in NC0, then the offline part Fˆ0(R,Q) can be computed using a
QNC0f circuit that takes input (R,Q).
The Input Encoding (Item 3) consists of encoding each of the input qubits x1, . . . , xn in parallel.
The j-th input is encoded into the QRV Fˆ j(x j; J,Q), which is a disjoint QRV from all the other Fˆk’s.
Each Fˆ j(x j; J,Q) is computed by a QNC
0
f circuit (namely, the teleportation gadget) of size O(κd),
and this circuit acts on one EPR pair from Q. This Input Encoding is independent of the gates of F.
The Case of Classical Inputs. We observe here that when the input x is classical, the input
encoding process can also be taken to be entirely classical. Although applying the teleportation
gadget TP on the input bits appears to be a fully quantum operation since it involves both a
bit of the input x as well as half of an EPR pair, we note that the EPR pair can in this case be
“pre-measured” in the standard (computational) basis (so that it collapses to a pair of correlated
bits), and then one can apply a “classical” teleportation gadget, which is the same as TP except the
Hadamard gate is removed, and the Z(sz) and Z(sx) twirls are removed. Note that all that is left
are CNOTs and bit flip gates, which are classically implementable.
5.4 Gate Evaluation
Let p, κ, γ1, . . . , γp > 1 be integers and let γ = (γ1, . . . , γp). We now describe the gate evaluation
operation GateEvalp,κ,γ for a p-qubit gate, with the input encoded using κ-bit labels, and the j-th
output qubit encoded with γ j-bit labels (see Figure 4). It takes as input the following QRVs:
1. u = (u1, . . . , up)
2. k = (k1, . . . , kp) and a = (a1, . . . , ap) where we further decompose k j = (k j,z, k j,x). Each k j is 2κ
qubits, and a j is 2γ j qubits.
3. v = (v1, . . . , vp)
4. c = | fˆoff〉〈 fˆoff| where fˆoff is the classical RV describing the (offline portion of the) classical ran-
domized encoding of a correction function f (z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp) with topologyTγ that computes
a tuple of correction gadgets (Ĉorr1, . . . , Ĉorrp). Each correction gadget Corr j acts on 2γ j + 2
qubits.
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GateEvalp,κ,γ(k, u, a, v, c)
1. Controlled on the values (ℓ1,z, ℓ1,x, . . . , ℓp,z, ℓp,x) of QRVs (k1,z, k1,x, . . . , kp,z, kp,x) re-
spectively, and controlled on the value fˆoff of QRV c, coherently execute the clas-
sical randomized encoding evaluation procedure CDecγ( fˆoff, ℓ1,z, ℓ1,x, . . . , ℓp,z, ℓp,x)
to obtain a classical description of the correction circuits (Ĉorr1, Ĉorr2, . . . , Ĉorrp).
2. For j ∈ [p], update (u j, a j, v j)← Corr j(u j, a j, v j).
3. Output (k, u, a, v, c).
Figure 4: The gate evaluation operation for a p-qubit gate.
Note that the complexity of gate evaluation is dominated by the complexity of running the
decoding procedure CDecγ, which we assume to be polynomial in the encoding complexity of a
classical circuit with topology Tγ under CRE.
5.5 Circuit Evaluation
We now describe how to evaluate a general circuit F on input x, given its quantum randomized
encoding Fˆ(x). The evaluator depends on the topologyT of the circuit F, but does not depend on
the specific gates themselves. The evaluator picks an evaluation order π based on the topology
T (see Section 3.3.4), and sequentially evaluates each gate of the circuit F. Let B denote the set of
“gate placeholders” in the topologyT . Let T ⊆ O denote the set of output qubits to be traced out.
In the Figure, for 1 ∈ B, the arity of gate 1 is denoted by p1. The input to the circuit evaluation
is the topology T and the set of QRVs produced by Fˆ(x); in particular, the QRV D represents the
tuple (Dw)w∈O\T (the labels to decode the output wires).
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Dec(T, e, a, c,D)
1. Compute an evaluation order π for the topologyT.
2. (Gate evaluation) For 1 ∈ B ordered according to π:
(a) Let (w1, . . . ,wp1) = inwire(1) and (w
′
1
, . . . ,w′p1) = outwire(1) denote the or-
dered sequences of input and output wires of 1, respectively. Let γ1 =
(κw′
1
, . . . , κw′p1 ) denote the label lengths for the output wires.
(b) Let k1 = (aw1 , . . . , awp1 ) denote the ancilla QRVs of the input wires. Let
u1 = (ew1out, . . . , e
wp1
out ) denote the input wire QRVs to 1. Let a
1 = (aw
′
1 , . . . , a
w′p1 )
denote the ancilla QRVs of the output wires. Let v1 = (e
w′
1
in
, . . . , e
w′p1
in
) denote
the output wire QRVs of 1.
(c) Update (k 1, u 1, a 1, v 1, c1)← GateEvalp1,κ1,γ1(k 1, u 1, a 1, v 1, c1).
3. (Output decoding) For output wires w ∈ O \ T :
(a) Coherently controlled on Dw which is in the state |ℓw
z,0
, ℓw
z,1
, ℓw
x,0
, ℓw
x,1
〉, apply the
inverse of the encrypted Pauli gadget PG†ℓw to registers a
wewout where a
w is
the control and ewout is the target.
4. Output (ewout)w∈O\T .
Figure 5: The decoder of the scheme QRE.
Recall the complexity upper bound cd specified in Lemma 4.3. The complexity of the decoder
is O(|B| · poly(cd) + n), which is polynomial in the complexity of the encoding procedure.
5.6 The Simulator
We now present the simulator Sim for QRE. It takes as input the topologyT of the circuit being
simulated, as well as a quantum state d that is supposed to represent the output of a quantum
operation F. We assume thatT has n input terminals, and that the input d consists of |O \T | qubits
(i.e. the number of output qubits ofT that aren’t traced out).
Intuitively the simulator computes the encoding of the identity circuit E with input d (so the
output should be d). However there is a subtlety in that our model of quantum circuit topology
technically allows for reodering of qubits, so placing identity gates for all the placeholder gates of
T may still result in a nontrivial permutation of qubits. Furthermore, the topologyT may trace out
some qubits. Thus the simulator pads the input d with some zeroes, shuffles the qubits according
to the inverse of the permutation effected by the topologyT, and then computes the randomized
encoding of E and the shuffled input.
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Sim(T , d)
1. LetEdenote the general quantum circuit with topologyT and gate setG consisting
only of identity gates. Let n = |I| = |O| denote the number of input and output
terminals of the topologyT. Compute the bijection ξ : I → O that is the result of
the (unitary part of) E. Let Pξ denote the unitary that swaps n qubits according to
the bijection ξ.
2. Let d′ denote the n-qubit state d ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗|T .
3. Output the randomized encoding Enc(E,P−1
ξ
(d′)).
Figure 6: The simulator for the scheme QRE.
Clearly the complexity of the simulation procedure is polynomial in the complexity of the
encoding procedure.
6 Correctness and Privacy Analysis
Wenowanalyze the correctness and privacy of theQRE scheme. We first perform the analysis for a
single gate evaluation, and then use that to analyze the scheme for an entire circuit. Recall that we
assume the existence of a classical randomized encoding scheme CRE that has perfect correctness,
ε-privacy against a class of distinguishersD of size S general quantum circuits, and has polynomial
time encoding, decoding and simulation procedures. For all integers p, γ1, . . . , γp > 1, let CDecγ
and CSimγ denote the decoder and simulator for CRE for classical circuits with topology Tγ,
respfectively (see Section 5.2.1 for a definition of Tγ).
Some Notation. We introduce some additional notation that will aid the analysis. Given a pure
state |ψ〉, we write
J|ψ〉K = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
That is, J·K denotes the density matrix corresponding to a pure state.
6.1 Correctness and Privacy of a Single Gate Evaluation
Fix integers p, κ, γ1, . . . , γp > 1. Fix a p-qubit gate 1 and a p-qubit QRV m. Fix an arbitrary QRV h
(that can be entangled with m). Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γp).
Consider the following classical randomness. Let r be a uniformly random string and let
ℓ = (ℓ j,b,a) j∈[p],b∈{x,z},a∈{0,1} be a vector of κ-bit labels that are computed using the label func-
tion labγ1( j, b, a; r), as described in Section 5.3. Let β = (β j,b,a) j∈[p],b∈{x,z},a∈{0,1} be a vector where
β j,b,a ∈ {0, 1}γ j . Let A = (A j) j∈[p] be a vector of uniformly random elements A j ∈ R2γ j+2. Let
s = (sb, j)b∈{x,z}, j∈[p] and t = (tb, j)b∈{x,z}, j∈[p] be vectors of uniformly random bits.
Note that in this Section 6.1, since we are focused on analyzing the evaluation of a single gate,
we index the random variables r,A, s, t differently than in Section 5.3.
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Define the density matrix
σℓ =
⊗
j
σℓ j =
⊗
j
E
z j ,x j
r
|ℓ j,z,z j , ℓ j,x,x j〉
z
where the expectation is over uniformly random bits z j, x j ∈ {0, 1}. Define the density matrix σβ
similarly. Given a vector ℓ of random labels, σℓ is a pair of labels for uniformly random z, x ∈ {0, 1}p
strings.
Registers. We define the relevant registers, initialized in the following way:
1. k = (k1, . . . , kp) where each k j is initialized with the density matrix of a random κ-bit label σℓ j .
2. u = (u1, . . . , up) that is initialized with m.
3. a = (a1, . . . , ap) where each a j is a pair (z j, x j) initialized with 2γ j zeroes.
4. v = (v1, . . . , vp) and u
′ = (u′
1
, . . . , u′p) where each pair vjuj′ is initialized in the state |EPR〉.
5. c initialized with all zeroes.
6. h is an arbitrary-sized register initialized with h.
Let (k, u, a, v, c, u′, h) denote the initial density matrix on these registers.
Operations. For all ℓ = (ℓ j,b,a) j∈[p],b∈{x,z},a∈{0,1}, let PGℓ denoted the tensor product PGℓ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗PGℓp
of encrypted Pauli gadgets from Section 5.1.3. Let GateEnc1,r,A,β,s,t denote the gate encoding
operation (described in Section 5.2) acting on registers uavc. Let GateEvalp,κ,γ denote the gate
evaluation unitary (described in Section 5.4), acting on registers ckuav.
We now consider the output of the the following sequence of operations on the QRV
(k, u, a, c, v, u′, h):
1. Apply PGℓ, controlled on k, to u. This decodes the labels in the register k and applies the
corresponding Pauli corrections to the input register u.
2. Apply the gate encoding operation GateEnc1,r,A,β,s,t to registers uavc.
3. Apply the gate evaluation operation GateEvalp,κ,γ to registers kuavc.
This sequence of operations on the input (k, u, a, c, v, u′, h) is depicted in Figure 7. The leftmost
column specifies the state of each register; the next column specifies the name of the registers.
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σℓ k •
GateEvalp,κ,γ
m u PGℓ
GateEnc1,r,A,β,s,t
|0〉 a
|0〉 c
v
u′
h h
|EPR〉⊗p
Figure 7: The circuit representation of a gate encoding, followed by the gate evaluation operation.
The next Lemma establishes that the output of Figure 7 is equal to the output of the following
circuit:
c
k
u
v
σβ a •
m u′ 1 PGβ
h h
ρ1
µ⊗2p
Figure 8: A circuit representation of the state equivalent to the output of Figure 7.
In other words, the effect of the circuit Figure 7 is to (1) teleport a state m that was originally in
register u and randomized by Paulis indicated by labels in register k, to register u′, (2) apply gate
1 to it, and (3) randomize it using labels in register a. The registers ckuv are in a state ρ1⊗µ⊗2p that
is in tensor product (i.e. unentangled) with registers au′h. This sets up the inductive argument we
use to prove correctness and privacy of the entire circuit evaluation in Section 6.2.
Lemma 6.1. Let p, κ, γ1, . . . , γp > 1 be integers. For all p-qubit states m and side information h, for all
p-qubit gates 1 and vectors β = (β j,b,a) j∈[p],b∈{x,z},a∈{0,1} where β j,b,a ∈ {0, 1}γ j , the state
E
r,A,s,t
GateEvalp,κ,γ ◦GateEnc1,r,A,β,s,t ◦ PGℓ
σℓ,m
u
,
u
v|EPR〉⊗p
vu′
}
~ , h
h

which is the output of the circuit specified in Figure 7 averaged over the randomness r,A, s, t, is equal to
(after rearranging registers)
ρ1
ck
⊗ µ⊗2p
uv
⊗
(
PGβ (σβ
a
, 1(m)
u′
), h
h
)
where PGβ acts on registers au
′, the density matrix ρ1 is on registers ck, µ is the maximally mixed state
on a qubit. Furthermore, the density matrix ρ1 is (ε,D)-indistinguishable from a density matrix ργ on
registers ck that only depends γ.
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Proof. We first analyze the output of Figure 7with the randomness r,A, s, t fixed. We also condition
on a choice of randomness z, x ∈ {0, 1}p for σℓ; i.e., we condition on the register k j being in the state
|ℓ j,z,z j , ℓ j,x,x j〉.
Gate evaluationwith fixed randomness. The operationsPGℓ, GateEnc1,r,A,β,s,t, andGateEvalp,κ,γ
are unitary, so it suffices to calculate the resulting state when the registers u j, v j, u
′
j
are in pure basis
states |u j〉 and |EPR〉, respectively.
After applying PGℓ, from Equation (5.13) we have that the state of registers u is⊗
j
Zz jXx j |u j〉 . (6.1)
Now we apply the gate encoding operation GateEnc1,r,A,β,s,t, which applies the gate 1, the tele-
portation gadgets TP j = TPβ j,s j,t j , the randomizers A j, and then updates the register c to store the
(offline part of the) randomized encoding fˆoff of a correction function f . (See Section 5.2 for the
detailed description of the gate encoding operation.)
We compute the application of these unitaries in sequence. Applying 1 to u yields(
1
⊗
j
Zz jXx j |u j〉
)
=
(⊗
j
R†j
)
1 |u1, . . . , up〉 (6.2)
where R = (R1, . . . ,Rp) are the single-qubit correction unitaries promised by Equation (5.1). Ap-
plying the teleportation gadgets and randomizers, and depicting the results diagrammatically, we
get that the registers uavc are in the state
|u〉 u 1 R†
TPβ,s,t A|0〉 a
|EPR〉⊗p v
| fˆoff〉 u′
where TPβ,s,t =
⊗
j TPβ j,s j,t j , R
† =
⊗
j R
†
j
, and A =
⊗
jA j.
We now consider the application of the gate evaluation operation GateEvalp,κ,γ. When
controlled on registers c (which is in the state | fˆoff〉) and k (which we assume to be in the
state
⊗
j |ℓ j,z,z j , ℓ j,x,x j〉), the gate evaluation operation first coherently computes the function
CDecγ( fˆoff, ℓ1,z,z1 , ℓ1,x,x1 , . . . , ℓp,z,zp , ℓp,x,xp) = f (z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp) = (Ĉorr1, . . . , Ĉorrp), where Corr j =
CorrA j,R j,β j,s j,t j is the correction gadget described in Section 5.1.2. Since the classical randomized en-
coding scheme CREγ has perfect correctness, the evaluator then perfectly applies Corr j to registers
u ja jv j. Thus the state of registers uavu
′ is depicted diagrammatically next:
|u〉 u 1 R†
TPβ,s,t A CorrA,R,β,s,t|0〉 a
v
u′
|EPR〉⊗p
42
where CorrA,R,β,s,t =
⊗
j Corr j. By the circuit identity proved in Lemma 5.2, this is equivalent to
|u〉 u 1 R† R
TPβ,s,t|0〉 a
v
u′
|EPR〉⊗p
By Lemma 5.1, the teleportation gadget results in the following state on registers uvau′:
= 2−p
∑
d,e∈{0,1}p
(⊗
j
Xt j,zZs j,z |d j〉
u j
⊗ Xt j,xZs j,x |e j〉
v j
⊗ |β j,z,d j , β j,x,e j〉
a j
)
⊗
(⊗
j
Xe jZd j
)
1 |u1, . . . , up〉
u′
(6.3)
Averaging over the randomness. Everything we have analyzed so far has been with respect to
fixing the classical randomness r,A, s, t, z, x. We now average over this randomness in stages.
We first average over the phase bits sx, sz. Observe that the only registers that depend on the
phase bits are u and v. Thus, for fixed A, r, t, z, x the output state of the operation in Figure 7
averaged over the phase bits s is
· · ·
ck
⊗ 2−2p E
s
∑
d,e
d′,e′
⊗
j
Xt j,zZs j,z(|d j〉〈d′j|)
uj
⊗ Xt j,xZs j,x(|e j〉〈e′j|)
vj
 ⊗ · · ·au′h
= · · ·
ck
⊗ 2−2p
∑
d,e
d′,e′
⊗
j
Es j,z(−1)s j,z(d j⊕d
′
j
)
Xt j,z(|d j〉〈d′j|)
uj
⊗ E
s j,x
(−1)s j,x(e j⊕e′j)Xt j,x (|e j〉〈e′j|)
vj
 ⊗ · · ·au′h
= · · ·
ck
⊗ 2−2p
∑
d,e
⊗
j

q
Xt j,z |d j〉
y
uj
⊗ qXt j,x |e j〉y
vj
⊗
r
|β j,z,d j , β j,x,e j〉
z
a j
 ⊗
(
X(e)Z(d)1 (m), h
u′h
)
= · · ·
ck
⊗ E
d,e
⊗
j

q|d j ⊕ t j,z, e j ⊕ t j,x〉y
ujvj
 ⊗

PGβ
(⊗
j
r
|β j,z,d j , β j,x,e j〉
z
a
, 1 (m)
u′
)
, h
h

(6.4)
where the “· · · ” in registers ck denotesr
| fˆoff〉
z
c
⊗
⊗
j
r
|ℓ j,z,z j , ℓ j,x,x j〉
z
k
and the expectation over d, e is the uniform distribution of 2p bits. Next we average over the
randomness r, z, x, and A. Note that the only registers in Equation (6.6) that depend on this
randomness are c and k (because the randomized encoding fˆoff depends on r,A, and the labels in
register k depend on r, z, and x). We get
ρ1 = E
r,z,x,A
r
| fˆoff〉
z
⊗
⊗
j
r
|ℓ j,z,z j , ℓ j,x,x j〉
z
43
Finally, we average Equation (6.6) over the flip bits tz and tx. Notice that the only registers that
depend on t j,z and t j,x are u j and v j, and averaging over the flip bits will completely randomize
these qubits and replace them with the maximally mixed qubit µ:
ρ1
ck
⊗ µ⊗2p
uv
⊗ E
d,e

PGβ
(⊗
j
r
|β j,z,d j , β j,x,e j〉
z
a
, 1 (m)
u′
)
, h
h

(6.5)
= ρ1
ck
⊗ µ⊗2p
uv
⊗
PGβ(σβ
a
, 1 (m)
u′
)
, h
h
 (6.6)
We now establish the “Furthermore” part of the Lemma. Note that for a fixed setting of z, x
and A, the density matrix
E
r
r
| fˆoff〉
z
⊗
⊗
j
r
|ℓ j,z,z j , ℓ j,x,x j〉
z
is precisely the output distribution of theCREencoding of the correction function f (z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp)
– the fˆoff corresponds to the offline part of the encoding, and the ℓ j,z,z j , ℓ j,x,x j correspond to the labels
of the input bits z j, x j. The privacy guarantee of the classical randomized encoding scheme CREγ
thus yields
ρ1 ≈ε,D
(
E
A,z,x
CSimγ( f (z1, x1, . . . , zp, xp))
)
(6.7)
=
(
E
A,z,x
CSimγ(Ĉorr1, . . . , Ĉorrp)
)
. (6.8)
Recall that each correction gadget Ĉorr j = ĈorrA j,R j,β j,s j,t j is the circuit described in Section 5.1.2.
From the discussion in Section 5.1.2 wehave that the distribution of the gadget ĈorrA j,R j,β j,s j,t j , when
averaged over the randomizer A j, is the uniform distribution Γγ j over correction gadgets acting
on (2γ j + 2)-qubit correction gadgets. Furthermore, since the A j’s are all independent, this means
that the distribution of Ĉorr1, . . . , Ĉorrp, when averaged over the randomizers A = (A1, . . . ,Ap), is
simply the product distribution
⊗
j Γγ j . Thus Equation (6.8) is equal to CSimγ(
⊗
j Γγ j)⊗ σℓ which
is a density matrix ρ independent of 1 and only depends on γ. This completes the proof of the
Lemma.

6.2 Correctness and Privacy of Circuit Evaluation
We now analyze the correctness and privacy of the circuit evaluation operationDec. Fix an n-qubit
input x, quantum side information y (which may be entangled with x), and a general quantum
circuit F = (T,G). Let B denote the set of “gate placeholders” in the topologyT. As described in
Section 5.5, the circuit evaluation only depends on the topologyT; it sequentially evaluates each
gate inB according to some evaluation orderπ, and then decodes the outputwires using the labels
in the set O \ T . Given a gate 1 ∈ B, we write 1 + 1 to denote the successor gate to 1 in the sorted
order π. LetW denote the set of wires in the topologyT .
For every 1 ∈ B, let U1 denote the unitary gate corresponding to 1 in F, and let F<1 denote the
part of circuit F up to, but not including, U1. Recall that we assume thatZ = ∅, so F<1 represents a
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unitary operation. LetW<1 denote the input wires of all gates j that precede 1 in the topological
order. Thus,W<11 is equal to the empty set.
Similarly, define F>1 to denote the part of circuit F that starts at 1. DefineW>1 to denote the
output wires of gate 1 and all gates j that succeed 1 in the topological order. ThusW>11 is equal
toW\A11 .
Note that we haveW is equal to the disjoint unionW<1 ∪A1 ∪W>1 for all 1.
Active Wires. We define the notion of active wires during the evaluation process. Before the
evaluation of each gate 1 ∈ B in the circuit, there is a setA1 of active wires that, intuitively, “stores”
the intermediate state of the circuit encrypted by a one-time pad. We define the set of active wires
recursively: if 11 is the first gate in the circuit (according to the evaluation order π), then A11 is
simply the set of input wires I of the circuit. Suppose 12 is the second gate in the circuit. Then the
set of active wiresA12 would be input wires that do not touch 11, plus the output wires of gate 11.
More generally we have
A1+1 = (A1 \ inwire(1)) ∪ outwire(1). (6.9)
Note that for all 1, |A1| = n, and furthermore inwire(1) ⊆ A1 (i.e., the input wires to gate 1 are
active right before the evaluation of 1).
For 1 ∈ B, let τ1 denote the global state of the randomized encoding plus quantum side
information right before the evaluation of gate U1. For example, if 11 is the first gate, then τ11
is simply the quantum randomized encoding along with the quantum side information (Fˆ(x), y).
More generally, for 1 ∈ B the state τ1+1 is simply GateEval1(τ1) whereGateEval1 = GateEvalp1,κ1,γ1
is applied to registers (k 1, u 1, a 1, v 1, c 1) (see Section 5.5 for the definition of GateEval).
We also let τ∗ denote the global state after evaluating the last gate 1∗ of the ciruit F, i.e.,
τ∗ = GateEval1∗(τ1∗). We letA∗ denote the set of active wires after all the gate evaluations, which
is just the set of output wires of F.
TheEvaluation Invariant. Weprove that the intermediate states τ1 satisfy an evaluation invariant.
The QRVs (and their corresponding registers) and classical random variables referred to here are
specified in ??.
Lemma 6.2. For all 1 ∈ B ∪ {∗}, we have
τ1 = ω
F
1 ⊗ E
R>1
(⊗
k>1
GateEnck ◦
⊗
w∈A1
PGw
)
(∆1) (6.10)
where ◦ denotes operation composition, and
1. The density matrix ωF1 is on registers
(
(ew, aw)w∈W<1 , (e
w
in
)w∈A1 , (ck)k<1
)
, and it is (ε1,D)-
indistinguishable from a density matrix ω1 that only depends on the placeholder gate 1 ∈ B and
the topology T of F. Here, ε1 = (π(1) − 1)ε where π(1) indicates 1’s place in the evaluation order π.
2. The random variable R>1 is the concatenation of the classical random variables (rk)k>1,
(Aw, sw, tw)w∈W>1∪A1 , and (o
w)w∈O.
3. The density matrix ∆1 is a function of the randomness R
>1, and is on registers(
(ewout, a
w)w∈A1 , (ew, aw)w∈W>1 , (c
k)k>1, (D
w)w∈O\T
)
. It is the tensor product of the following states:
(a) For each wire w ∈ W>1, the registers ew = (ewin, ewout) are in the state |EPR〉, and aw is set to
all zeroes, and for all k > 1, the register c1 is set to all zeroes.
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(b) The registers of the active wire qubits plus the side information, ((ewout)w∈A1 , y), is in the state
(F<1(x), y) .
(c) For all active wire qubits w ∈ A1, the register aw is in the state
σw = E
d,e
r
|ℓwz,d, ℓwx,e〉
z
that is in tensor product with the rest of ∆1, where the expectation is over uniformly random bits
d, e, and the (ℓw
b,a
) are the wire labels computed in the Label Setup step of Figure 3.
(d) For all output wires w ∈ O \ T , the register Dw is in the state |ℓw〉.
4. For each active wire qubit w ∈ A1, PGw is the encrypted Pauli gadget PGℓw to applied to registers
(aw, ewout).
5. For all gates k, GateEnck is the gate encoding operation GateEnck,rk,Ak,βk,sk,tk , which acts on
registers (u k, ak, v k, ck), where uk = (ewout)w∈inwire(k) corresponds to the input wires to gate k,
ak = (aw)w∈outwire(k) denote the ancillas of the output wires of gate k, vk = (ewin)w∈outwire(k) de-
note the output wires of gate k, and ck is the register that stores the randomized encoding of the
correction function corresponding to gate k.
Proof. We prove that this invariant holds via induction.
Base Case. The base case is where 1 = 11 is the first gate. Note that W<11 = ∅, and the set of
active wiresA11 is simply the set of input wires I of F. Examining Figure 3, we see that the input
x was teleported into the EPR pairs (ew)w∈I using the teleportation gadget TP. Via a calculation
similar to that in Lemma 6.1, we see that the result of teleportation gadget is to place, for all w ∈ I,
the maximally mixed state µ into register ew
in
, place the state σℓw into register a
w, the qubit xw into
register ewout, and then apply the encrypted Pauli gadget PGℓw on registers (a
w, ewout). Thus the joint
state of the registers
(
(ewout)w∈I, y
)
is indeed in (x, y) = (F<11(x), y). The state ω
F
11
is simply µ⊗|I|,
which does not depend on F aside from the number of input wires. The rest of the conditions of
the invariant can be verified via inspection of Figure 3.
Inductive Step. We now assume that the invariant holds for up to some 1 ∈ B. Let R1 denote
the concatenation of the classical random variables r1, (Aw, sw, tw)w∈inwire(1), and note that R>1 =
(R1,R>1+1). Then τ1+1 = GateEval1(τ1) is equal to
ωF1 ⊗ E
R>1
(
GateEval1 ◦
⊗
k>1
GateEnck ◦
⊗
w∈A1
PGw
)
(∆1) (6.11)
= ωF1 ⊗ E
R>1+1
( ⊗
k>1+1
GateEnck
)
◦
( ⊗
w∈A1\inwire(1)
PGw
)
◦ E
R1
(
GateEval1 ◦GateEnc1 ◦ PG1
)
(∆1)
(6.12)
where PG1 =
⊗
w∈inwire(1) PGw, and in the last line we used that GateEval1 commutes with
GateEnck for all k > 1 + 1 and PGw for all w ∈ A1 \ inwire(1).
Let
k1 = (aw)w∈inwire(1) , u1 = (ewout)w∈inwire(1) , a
1 = (aw
′
)w′∈outwire(1) ,
v1 = (ew
′
in )w′∈outwire(1) , u
′ = (ew
′
out)w′∈outwire(1) .
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and let h1 denotes all the other registers of ∆1, and let h
1 denote the reduced density matrix of ∆1
on register h1. Then the unitary operation PG1 acts on registers k
1u1. Since inwire(1) ⊆ A1 (i.e.,
the input wires to gate 1 are active), by the inductive assumption we have that ∆1 on register a
w
is in the state σw that is in tensor product with the rest of τ1. Let u
1 denote the reduced density
matrix of ∆1 on the register u
1.
The unitary operation GateEnc1 acts on registers u
1a1v1c1. The state ∆1 on registers a
1 and c1
is all zeroes, by the inductive assumption. On registers v1u′, the state ∆1 is a tensor product of p1
EPR pairs, again by the inductive assumption.
The unitary operation GateEval1 acts on registers k
1u1a1v1c1u′.
By Lemma 6.1, we have that
E
R1
(
GateEval1 ◦GateEnc1 ◦ PG1
)
(∆1) = ρU1
c1k1
⊗ µ⊗2p1
u1v1
⊗
(
PGnext(1)(σnext(1)
a1
,U1(u
1)
u′
), h1
h1
)
(6.13)
where PGnext(1) =
⊗
w∈outwire(1) PGw, and σnext(1) =
⊗
w∈outwire(1) σw =⊗
w∈outwire(1) Ed,e
r
|ℓw
z,d
, ℓwx,e〉
z
.
Observe that the registers ((ewout)w∈A1 , y) of ∆1 are, by the inductive hypothesis, in the
state (F<1(x), y). On the right hand side of Equation (6.13), the joint state of registers
((ewout)w∈A1\inwire(1)∪outwire(1), y) is
(U1(F<1(x)), y) = (F<1+1(x), y).
By the update rule (Equation (6.9)), the register (ewout)w∈A1\inwire(1)∪outwire(1) is equal to (e
w
out)w∈A1+1 .
Thus, the state in Equation (6.13) has the form
ρU1 ⊗ µ⊗2p1 ⊗
( ⊗
w∈outwire(1)
PGw
)
(∆1+1).
Plugging this into Equation (6.12) we get that τ1+1 is equal to
ωF
1+1 ⊗ E
R>1+1
⊗
( ⊗
k>1+1
GateEnck
)
◦
( ⊗
w∈A1\inwire(1)
PGw
)
◦
( ⊗
w∈outwire(1)
PGw
)
(∆1+1) (6.14)
= ωF
1+1 ⊗ E
R>1+1
( ⊗
k>1+1
GateEnck
)
◦
( ⊗
w∈A1+1
PGw
)
(∆1+1) (6.15)
where ωF
1+1
= ωF1 ⊗ ρU1 ⊗ µ⊗2p1 , and we used the update rule (Equation (6.9)) once more.
We now argue that ωF
1+1
is (ε1+1,D)-indistinguishable from a density matrix ω1+1 that depends
only on the topology T of F. By Lemma 6.1, we have that ρU1 is (ε,D)-indistinguishable from a
density matrix ρ1 that only depends on the placement of the placeholder gate 1 in the topologyT.
Thus by Lemma 3.1 we have that
ωF
1+1 ≈ε1,D ω1 ⊗ ρU1 ⊗ µ⊗2p1 (6.16)
≈ε,D ω1 ⊗ ρ1 ⊗ µ⊗2p1 (6.17)
which implies that ωF
1+1
is (ε1 + ε,D)-indistinguishable from ω1+1 = ω1 ⊗ ρ1 ⊗ µ⊗2p1 , a state that
only depends on the topology T. We see that this satisfies the claimed invariant Equation (6.10)
for τ1+1, which completes the induction. 
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Correctness. We now use the invariant to establish the perfect correctness of the QRE scheme.
Theorem 6.3. For all circuits F and n-qubit inputs x and quantum side information y, we have
(Dec(Fˆ(x)), y) = (F(x), y) . (6.18)
Proof. Let τ∗ denote the gloal state of the randomized encoding, along with the side information,
after the evaluation of all the gates 1 ∈ B. In other words, this is the global state right before the
output decoding step in the Dec operation. Recall the definition of the classical random variable
o = (ow)w∈O in Section 5.5. The output labels ℓw for w ∈ O are a function of ow. LetA∗ denote final
set of active wires, which is the set O of output wires. Let F∗ denote the unitary part of F; i.e. the
operation without the discarding of the qubits.
We have that from Lemma 6.2 that
τ∗ = ωF∗ ⊗ Eo
(⊗
w∈O
PGℓw
)
(∆∗)
where ∆∗ is a tensor product of the following states:
1. The state (F∗(x), y) in registers (ewout)w∈A∗ ,
2. The register aw for w ∈ A∗ is in the state σw = Ed,e
r
|ℓw
z,d
, ℓwx,e〉
z
where the expectation is over
uniformly random bits d, e ∈ {0, 1}.
3. For all w ∈ O \ T , the register Dw is in the state |ℓw〉.
The output decoding step of Dec then applies the inverse gadget PG†ℓw on registers (a
w, ewout)
for all w ∈ O \ T , yielding
ωF∗ ⊗ Eo
(⊗
w∈T
PGℓw
)
(∆∗) . (6.19)
Finally, the output ofDec is the (ewout)w∈O\T registers of Equation (6.19). Since thePGr1 are unitaries
that do not act on (ewout)w∈O\T , we get that (Dec(Fˆ(x)), y) is equal to
(TrT (F∗(x)), y)
which is exactly equal to (F(x), y). This establishes Equation (6.18). 
Privacy. We now use the invariant to establish the privacy of the QRE scheme.
Lemma 6.4. For all quantum circuits F, F′ with the same topology T, for all n-qubit inputs x, x′ that are
entangled with side information y and y′, respectively such that (F(x), y) = (F′(x′), y′), we have that
(Fˆ(x), y) ≈δ,D′ (Fˆ′(x′), y′)
where δ = O(s · ε) with s being the number of gates of T andD′ denotes the set of distinguishers of size at
most S −Λ with Λ being the circuit complexity of the decoding procedure Dec.
Proof. Since F, F′ have the same topology, the sets B,O are the same for both, as well as the set of
wiresW.
We consider the unitary part of the evaluation procedure Dec – that is, the procedure after the
decoding step, but before the tracing out of registers at the end. Call this unitary map Dec∗.
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We start with analyzing the randomized encoding of (F, x). From Equation (6.19) in the proof
of Theorem 6.3 we see that
(Dec∗(Fˆ(x)), y) (6.20)
= ωF∗ ⊗ Eo
(⊗
w∈T
PGℓw
)
(∆∗) (6.21)
= ωF∗ ⊗ Eo
(⊗
w∈T
PGℓw
) (F∗(x), y) ⊗ (
⊗
w∈O
σw
)
⊗
( ⊗
w∈O\T
J|ℓw〉K )
 (6.22)
where the (F∗(x), y) are in registers
(
(ewout)w∈O, y
)
, the σw are in register a
w, and |ℓw〉 are in register
Dw.
Recall the definition of the classical random variable o = (ow)w∈O in Section 5.5. The output
labels ℓw for w ∈ O are defined as follows: ℓw
b,0
= ow
b
and ℓw
b,1
= ow
b
⊕ 1 for b ∈ {x, z}. Note that for a
wire w ∈ T , a qubit m, and an auxiliary quantum system h (which may be entangled with m), we
have that
E
ow
(
PGℓw
(
σw,m
)
, h
)
= E
ow ,d,e
(
PGℓw
( J|owz ⊕ d, owx ⊕ e〉K ,m), h) (6.23)
= E
ow ,d,e
(J|owz ⊕ d, owx ⊕ e〉K ,XdZe(m), h) (6.24)
= µ⊗2 ⊗
(
E
d,e
XdZe(m), h
)
(6.25)
= µ⊗3 ⊗ h (6.26)
where µ denotes a uniformly random bit. In the second line, we used the definition of PGℓw ;
in the third line we used that owz and o
w
x are uniformly random and independent bits that are
uncorrelated with (m, h); in the fourth line, we used that applying XdZe for randomly chosen
d, e ∈ {0, 1} randomizes a qubit and replaces it with the maximally mixed state µ, decoupling it
from h.
Thus, the effect of applying PGℓw for w ∈ T in Equation (6.22) is to effectively trace out the
(ewout)w∈T registers and replace them with the maximally mixed state. This yields the state
ωF∗ ⊗ (F(x), y) ⊗ µ⊗3|T | ⊗ ζ⊗|O\T | (6.27)
where ζ is the six qubit stateEow σw⊗ J|ℓw〉K (σw is a two-qubit maximally mixed state, and Eow J|ℓw〉K
is the uniform mixture over |0101〉, |1001〉, |1010〉, |0110〉).
From Lemma 6.2 we have that the state ωF∗ is (|B| · ε,D)-indistinguishable from a state ω∗
that depends only on the topology T of F. Thus by Lemma 3.1 the state in Equation (6.27) is
(|B| · ε,D)-indistinguishable from
ω∗ ⊗ (F(x), y) ⊗ µ⊗3|T | ⊗ ζ⊗|O\T | = ω∗ ⊗ (F′(x′), y′) ⊗ µ⊗3|T | ⊗ ζ⊗|O\T | (6.28)
where in the equality we used that (F(x), y) = (F′(x′), y′). But then since F′ has the same topology
T, it is also the case that ω∗ is (|B| · ε,D)-indistinguishable from ωF′∗ , and therefore Equation (6.28)
is (|B| · ε,D)-indistinguishable from
ωF
′
∗ ⊗ (F′(x′), y′) ⊗ µ⊗3|T | ⊗ ζ⊗|O\T |
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which is precisely the output (Dec∗(Fˆ′(x′)), y′). Therefore we have (Dec∗(Fˆ(x)), y) is (2|B| · ε,D)-
indistinguishable from (Dec∗(Fˆ′(x′)), y′), and thus
sup
h,D∈D′
∥∥∥∥D((Fˆ(x), y) ⊗ h) −D((Fˆ′(x′), y′) ⊗ h)∥∥∥∥
1
(6.29)
= sup
h,D∈D′
∥∥∥∥D(((Dec∗)−1 ◦Dec∗(Fˆ(x)), y) ⊗ h) −D(((Dec∗)−1 ◦Dec∗(Fˆ′(x′)), y′) ⊗ h)∥∥∥∥
1
(6.30)
6 sup
h,D∈D
∥∥∥∥D((Dec∗(Fˆ(x)), y) ⊗ h) −D((Dec∗(Fˆ′(x′)), y′) ⊗ h)∥∥∥∥
1
(6.31)
6 δ (6.32)
where we use the fact that Dec∗ is unitary so it has an inverse, and in the third line we used that
the operation D ◦ (Dec∗)−1 has size at most S (because D has size at most S − Λ and Dec∗ — and
therefore (Dec∗)−1 — has size at most Λ). This implies the statement of the Lemma.

Theorem 6.5. For all circuit topologies T , there exists a simulator Sim such that for all circuits F with
topology T, all inputs x and side information y we have that
(Fˆ(x), y) ≈δ,D′ (Sim(F(x)), y)
where δ = O(s · ε) with s being the number of gates of T andD′ denotes the set of distinguishers of size at
most S −Λ with Λ being the circuit complexity of the decoding procedure Dec.
Proof. Recall the definition of the simulator Sim, presented in Section 5.6: given input d, the
simulator Sim computes the randomized encoding Eˆ(P−1
ξ
(d ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗|T |)) where E is the circuit with
topologyT with all identities gates, and Pξ is the permutation on the n qubits that is implemented
by the topologyT (before tracing out). In other words, the quantum operation E implements the
permutation Pξ on the n input qubits, and then traces out the qubits indexed by T . Therefore
E(P−1
ξ
(F(x) ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗|T |)) = F(x). This also holds when consider external side information y. Thus
(Sim(F(x)), y) = (Eˆ(P−1ξ (F(x) ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗|T |)), y) ≈δ,D′ (Fˆ(x), y)
where the approximation follows from Lemma 6.4. This completes the proof. 
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